Dell’s Third Horizon: The Innovation Imperative by Simmons, Heather
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dell’s Third Horizon: 
The Innovation Imperative 
 
by 
 
          Heather Anne Simmons 
 
 Submitted to OCAD University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
Master of Arts 
in 
Digital Futures 
 
                  Toronto, Ontario, Canada, April 2015 
 
       ©Heather Simmons, 2015 	    
Dell’s Third Horizon: 
The Innovation Imperative Heather Simmons 
	  
	   ii	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
This page intentionally left blank.  
Dell’s Third Horizon: 
The Innovation Imperative Heather Simmons 
	  
	   iii	  
Author’s Declaration 
 
I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the 
thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners. I authorize 
OCAD University to lend this thesis to other institutions or individuals for the purpose 
of scholarly research. I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to 
the public. I further authorize OCAD University to reproduce this thesis by 
photocopying or by other means, in total or in part, at the request of other institutions 
or individuals for the purpose of scholarly research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  
Dell’s Third Horizon: 
The Innovation Imperative 
Heather Simmons 
Master of Arts 
OCAD University 2015  
 
	  
	   iv	  
  
Abstract 
To the disrupters go the spoils.  Those who disrupt industries can change consumer 
behavior, alter economics, and transform lives.  What caused the once-disruptive Dell’s 
growth rate and stock price to decline in the mid-2000s, and how might Dell thrive again?   
What are the lessons for other companies?  This study analyzes how innovative cultures are 
created, lost, and reborn in large companies through the lens of a long-term case study, 
namely my 13 years at Dell.  The research fuses Innovation and Foresight frameworks, 
principally Curry & Hodgson’s Three Horizons framework and Hill’s Willing and Able 
framework, and shows that Dell lost its innovation edge when a cultural shift and the 
pressures of Wall Street crushed risk-taking.  It posits that large companies should adopt an 
“intelligent gambler’s” approach to innovation – namely investing in other companies in 
order to effectively leverage their significant capital to take intelligent risks in a fast-changing 
world. 
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Chapter One – Introduction 
To the disrupters go the spoils.  Those who disrupt their industries change consumer 
behavior, alter economics, and transform lives.   Companies can disrupt by creating 
revolutionary new technologies, as Corning Glassworks and Bell Labs did with the invention 
of fiber-optic cables in 1970 (Johnson 2014, 30), or via design, as Apple did with its various 
“i” products.   Or, a company can disrupt with a revolutionary business model, as Dell did in 
the 1980s with the idea of selling $2,000+ computers over the phone. 
 Nobody thought it would work.  As Bill Sharpe, whose advertising agency, Sharpe 
Blackmore, held the Dell Canada account from 1996-2006, says, “I had a business partner in 
California, who said, we have a client, Dell.  They sell computers over the phone, and ship it 
to you.  I said, ‘There’s no way, who’s gonna buy a computer over the phone?  They’re 
complicated.’”   
In 1992, the year I joined the company, Dell had a 3.5% share of global personal 
computer (“PC”) revenues, to IBM’s dominant 12.4% (Harte 2014, 126).  The internet was 
used by almost no one outside of nerdy academic circles, e-commerce was 5 years away, and 
eventual Amazon founder Jeff Bezos was still working at financial firm D.E. Shaw.  
But work it did, and spectacularly.  Until it didn’t.  And therein lies the tale.  	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Experience and Motivation 
When I graduated from Harvard Business School, one of my professors, the late 
Louis “By” Barnes, asked why I didn’t stay to get my PhD in Organizational Behavior 
(“OB”).  OB???  No way!  Not the soft stuff.  I was $40,000 in debt and needed to make 
money.  Besides, weren’t people interchangeable, as long as the numbers were there?  Thus 
demonstrating (and not for the first or last time) that 27-year olds do not, in fact, know 
everything.  I worked at Dell from 1992-2005.  Dell’s success was driven by its innovative 
business model, but also by the “soft stuff” – culture and employee commitment.  A $10,000 
investment in Dell at its 1988 initial public offering (“IPO”) would have yielded a fortune of 
~$6 million at the stock’s peak, Dell’s valuation having risen by $100 billion in that time. 
 
Figure	  1	  -­‐	  Dell's	  stock	  market	  valuation,	  1988-­‐2012.	  	  Excludes	  debt.	  	  Note:	  	  Dell's	  fiscal	  year	  ends	  January	  
31.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  1998	  valuation	  of	  $125	  billion	  represents	  shares	  outstanding	  multiplied	  by	  stock	  
price	  as	  of	  January	  31,	  1999,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  Source:	  	  Annual	  reports,	  (“Dell	  closing	  costs,”	  2015).	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In 1990, at the age of 24, Michael Dell was named the “Entrepreneur of the Year” by 
Inc magazine (Richman, 1990).  In 2005, Dell topped Fortune’s list of America’s Most 
Admired Companies (“Dell tops Fortune magazine’s list of most admired companies - 
Greensboro - Triad Business Journal,” 2005).   
However, by 2008, Dell had lost $100 billion in stock market value, Amazon was 
king of the direct distribution business, Apple had launched a slew of innovative consumer 
products including the iPhone, and Dell’s low cost advantage was under attack by Asian 
competitors.  In 2013, Michael Dell and Silver Lake Partners took the company private for 
$24.9 billion, the 11th largest leveraged buyout (“LBO” – typically a go-private transaction 
financed by significant debt) in the world’s history (Hester 2013, par. 5). 
	  
  
Figure	  2	  -­‐	  Dell's	  stock	  price	  performance	  relative	  to	  competitors,	  1991-­‐2012.	  	  1991	  stock	  
price	  used	  as	  base	  and	  set	  to	  100%	  for	  all	  competitors.	  	  Source:	  	  (“Dell	  closing	  costs,”	  2015),	  
Google	  Finance,	  Yahoo	  Finance.	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Summary of the Research Question 
The question is, “What caused Dell’s growth rate and stock price to decline in the 
mid-2000s, and how might Dell thrive once again?”  My research focuses on answering this 
question, using a literature review, a new innovation framework from the authors of 
Collective Genius, the Three Horizons method, field interviews with former Dell employees, 
and observations from my visit to Dell’s customer conference, Dell World.  This work 
indicates that Dell’s reduced growth rate and stock price decline was driven by the pressures 
of Wall Street and the death of risk-taking.  I believe that Dell can thrive once again by 
rebuilding its entrepreneurial culture, staying private, and adopting a venture capitalist’s 
approach to innovation. 
Scope of the Study 
This study focuses on the period from 1989 to the present.  Ten interviews were 
conducted with former Dell employees or partners.  No interviews were conducted with 
current Dell employees to avoid the inadvertent disclosure of non-public information.  For 
the same reason, all numerical data are from published sources.   
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Chapter Two – Background 
This section provides a brief overview of Dell’s financial performance, followed by a 
description of the direct business model, a critical driver of its success. 
Financial Performance 
By many measures, Dell is a very successful company.  From inception in 1984 to 
the fall of 2013, it generated about $800 billion in cumulative revenues, according to its 
annual reports.  Annual sales grew at a torrid clip for its first 20 years.  As shown in Figure 3, 
from 1991 to 2005, annual revenues grew at a compound annual growth rate (“CAGR”) of 
over 34%.  By 2005-2012, however, the CAGR had slowed to .3%.
	  
Figure	  3	  -­‐	  Dell	  revenues,	  1991-­‐2012.	  	  Note:	  	  Dell's	  fiscal	  year	  ends	  January	  31.	  	  Therefore,	  Dell's	  2006	  
revenue	  of	  $57.4	  billion,	  as	  shown	  above,	  represents	  revenue	  for	  the	  fiscal	  year	  ended	  January	  31,	  2007,	  
and	  so	  on.	  	  Source:	  	  Annual	  reports.	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Michael Dell started the company in his college dorm room in 1984.  By 1998, Dell 
was generating over $1 billion in profits every year.  Figure 4 shows Dell’s annual net income 
from 1991-2012.
 
Figure	  4	  -­‐	  Dell's	  net	  income,	  1991-­‐2012.	  	  Note:	  	  Dell's	  fiscal	  year	  ends	  January	  31.	  	  Therefore,	  Dell's	  2006	  
net	  income	  of	  $2.6	  billion,	  as	  shown	  above,	  represents	  net	  income	  for	  the	  fiscal	  year	  ended	  January	  31,	  
2007,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  Source:	  	  Annual	  reports.	  
As shown in Figure 5, through 2005, Dell’s unit growth rate consistently outpaced 
the market, leading it to the #1 market share position worldwide.  However, as discussed 
further in Chapter 5 and shown in Figures 3, 4, and 5, by 2006 Dell’s unit, revenue, and net 
income growth slowed substantially.  In 2007, HP surpassed Dell for the #1 worldwide unit 
share position (Kitagawa 2009, par. 13).  
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Figure	  5	  -­‐	  Dell	  unit	  growth	  rates	  relative	  to	  market,	  1992-­‐2014.	  	  All	  figures	  are	  for	  the	  calendar	  year.	  	  
Source:	  	  Gartner,	  IDC,	  author's	  analysis.	  
Dell’s stock also performed exceptionally well until about 2005.  Cumulatively, it 
appreciated over 13,000% from its initial public offering (“IPO”) in 1988 to October 2013 
(“Dell closing costs,” 2015), yielding over 24 times the return on the S&P 500 stock index 
(“S&P 500: INDEXSP:.INX historical prices - Google Finance,” 2015).  Dell’s annual 
return on equity from 1990 through 2012 averaged 42%, according to its annual reports.  
Dell’s stock price climbed from about 10 cents a share at IPO to over $50 a share by the end 
of 1999 (“Dell closing costs,” 2015).  It dropped in 2000 along with other technology stocks 
when the dot.com bubble burst, but had recovered to $41 a share by December 31, 2004 
(“Dell closing costs,” 2015).  By 2012, however, it had declined to about $10 a share.  	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The Direct Business Model 
Dell’s direct business model was a crucial driver of its financial performance.  In the 
classic indirect business model used by Compaq, IBM, and most others in the PC industry, a 
computer manufacturer sells through two layers of distribution, a distributor and a reseller 
(often referred to as “the channel”), in order to reach the end customer.
 
Figure	  6	  -­‐	  Indirect	  business	  model.	  
By contrast, in the direct distribution or “build-to-order” model pioneered by Dell in 
1984, the computer manufacturer does not build a product until a customer places an order.  
The manufacturer then ships it directly to the customer, bypassing the middleman. 
 
Figure	  7	  -­‐	  Direct	  business	  model.	  
The direct distribution model results in a value proposition for the customer of lower 
costs, faster time to market, and better customer service (no finger pointing).  As calculated 
by technology analyst Steven Fortuna in 1997, the direct model provided Dell with a 14 
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point cost advantage over industry players with indirect models.  He estimated that Dell 
saved 5% by avoiding the channel mark-ups, 4% due to higher inventory turns, 2.5% due to 
avoiding price protection, and 2.5% due to other items (Fortuna 1997, 6).  Dell would then 
pass these lower costs to customers via lower prices.  Fewer inventories also meant that Dell 
was typically two months faster to market with new products.  Lower prices and newer 
products gave Dell an advantage during major product transitions such as Pentium.   
	  
Figure	  8	  -­‐	  Dell	  ad	  from	  1995	  touting	  Pentium	  leadership.	  	  Source:	  	  Photo	  of	  ad	  from	  author's	  collection. 
The direct business model also gave Dell one other critical advantage – higher cash 
flow due to an efficient cash conversion cycle (Fisher 1998, par. 12-14), sometimes referred 
to as negative working capital.   The cash conversion cycle is calculated as days sales in 
receivables, plus days sales in inventory, less days sales in payables.  A negative cash 
conversion cycle, which Dell had, means that a company is getting paid for sales faster than 
Dell’s Third Horizon: 
The Innovation Imperative Heather Simmons 
	  
	   12	  
it is paying its suppliers (a good thing).  Dell had less cash tied up in inventory than its 
indirect competitors, due to its model.  In addition, Dell’s customers, primarily businesses 
and governments, often paid Dell faster than it paid its own suppliers, meaning that less cash 
was tied up in accounts receivable.  Cash was therefore coming in much faster than it was 
going out.   This advantage persists – Dell’s most recent publicly available annual cash 
conversion cycle figure was a negative 36 days (Dell 2013b, 51), compared to a positive 6 
days for IBM (IBM 2013, 70-72) and a positive 21 days for Hewlett-Packard (“HP”) 
(Hewlett-Packard 2012, 67) for the closest equivalent period.  These advantages led Dell to 
superior sales and net income performance throughout the 1990s, as depicted in Figures 9, 
10, and 11 below. 
	  
Figure	  9	  -­‐	  Revenue	  by	  major	  PC	  competitor,	  1991-­‐2000.	  	  Note:	  	  Dell’s	  fiscal	  year	  ends	  January	  31.	  	  
Therefore,	  Dell’s	  1998	  revenue	  figure	  of	  $18.2	  billion,	  as	  shown	  above,	  represents	  revenue	  for	  the	  fiscal	  
year	  ended	  January	  31,	  1999,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  Source:	  	  Annual	  reports.	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Figure	  10	  -­‐	  Net	  income	  by	  major	  PC	  competitor,	  1991-­‐2000.	  	  Note:	  	  Dell’s	  fiscal	  year	  ends	  January	  31.	  	  
Therefore,	  1998	  net	  income	  of	  $1.46	  billion,	  as	  shown	  above,	  represents	  net	  income	  for	  the	  fiscal	  year	  
ended	  January	  31,	  1999,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  Source:	  	  Annual	  reports.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  11	  -­‐	  Percentage	  net	  income	  by	  major	  PC	  competitor,	  1991-­‐2000.	  	  Note:	  	  Dell’s	  fiscal	  year	  ends	  
January	  31.	  	  Therefore,	  1998	  net	  income	  percentage	  of	  8%,	  as	  shown	  above,	  represents	  the	  net	  income	  
percentage	  for	  the	  fiscal	  year	  ended	  January	  31,	  1999,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  Source:	  	  Annual	  reports.	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For over 20 years Dell’s model provided it with lower costs and faster time to market.  
Then competitors delivered more innovative products (such as tablets and smartphones) and 
services (such as security and cloud services), better design, and software.  As we will see in the 
literature review, innovation is Dell’s best chance for “surthrival,” a word coined by Dell’s former 
president, Joel Kocher. Surthrival means to not just survive, but to thrive.
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Chapter Three – Literature Review 
Defining Disruptive Innovation 
Innovation is vital to a strong economy.  Economists estimate that over half the 
growth in the global economy results from disruptive innovation (Hausman and Johnston 
2014, 2721).  But what do we mean by innovation?  As Harvard Business School (“HBS”) 
professor Linda Hill and her co-authors say in their book, Collective Genius: 
Innovation is the creation of something both novel and useful…It can be a new 
product, a new service, a new business model (emphasis added), a new way of 
organizing, or a new film made in a new way. (L. Hill et al. 2014, 11) 
I add that an innovation is something that is launched or introduced into the 
marketplace or culture.   Inventions not introduced to the market are science experiments.   
HBS professor Clayton Christensen, a leading innovation scholar, defined the 
additional term disruptive innovation, later renamed empowering innovation, in his 1997 book 
The Innovator’s Dilemma: 
Disruptive technologies bring to a market a very different value proposition than had 
been available previously.  Generally, disruptive technologies underperform 
established products…But they have other features that a few fringe (and generally 
new) customers value…disruptive technologies are typically cheaper, simpler, smaller, 
and frequently, more convenient to use. (Christensen 1997, xv) 
For example, small “Smart Cars” are disruptive to the automotive industry.  Small 
transistors were a disruptive technology relative to huge vacuum tubes.  Drone delivery of 
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packages is disruptive to Canada Post (lots of things could be disruptive to Canada Post, 
which seems to have a delivery schedule generated by a random algorithm, but I digress).    
Christensen also identified a different type of innovation, sustaining innovation, 
which typically improves the performance of existing established products in mainstream 
markets (Nisen 2012, 2).  In addition, he defined efficiency innovation, which involves 
reducing costs through simplified delivery or processes (Nisen 2012, 2). 
I do not think Dr. Christensen’s definition of disruptive technologies is completely 
adequate today.  It implies an inferior but “good enough” product creeping up into the 
bottom of a market, at a cheaper price than the existing offering.  Today, technology often 
allows us to create superior products that leapfrog existing market offerings (i.e., the impact 
of Pixar and its CGI magic on the movie industry).  Therefore, I prefer the definition of 
disruptive technologies posited by McKinsey, one of the world’s foremost management 
consulting companies.  McKinsey views a disruptive technology as one with a broad scope of 
impact (billions of people), significant economic value (trillions of dollars of revenue), and 
disruptive economic power (i.e., the potential to create winners and losers) (Manyika et al. 
2013, 2-3).  McKinsey includes next generation genomics, the internet of things, and 
advanced energy storage as disruptive technologies.  These technologies do not underperform 
existing technologies. 	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As noted by Dr. Hill and her co-authors, disruption does not have to come from a 
technology or product alone.  Disruptive innovation can also occur in the form of a new 
service, or a new business model. 
Exponential Acceleration 
Why is innovation more important than ever today?  In extended periods of rapid 
change, innovation is critical, and sustained innovation is “perhaps the only enduring 
competitive advantage” (Hill et al. 2014, 9).  The current digital wave of innovation 
spawned by the internet is far more rapid than that brought on by the Industrial Revolution 
of the late 1700s, which brought us the steam engine and began the acceleration of 
innovation.  It is also faster than the wave of innovation brought on by the internal 
combustion engine in the late 1800s.  As an example, while it took electricity 45 years to 
reach 90% of US residents, it took cell phones just 20 years to reach that penetration 
(“Increasing Ubiquity” 2009, par. 13). 
What is it about digital technologies in particular that causes this acceleration?  MIT 
professors Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee, in their book The Second Machine Age, 
posit that the accelerated pace of the digital revolution is driven by three factors:  exponential 
improvement (Moore’s Law), digitized information, and recombinant innovation.   
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Moore’s Law states that “The complexity for minimum component costs has 
increased at a rate of roughly a factor of two per year…” (Moore 1965, 114).  In other 
words, the amount of hardware computing power you can get for a dollar doubles every year.  
In terms we can all understand, if you put a dollar in the bank and applied Moore’s Law to 
it, you’d have $16 million to retire on in 25 years.  Whoa, everybody just woke right up.  
	  
Figure	  12	  -­‐	  Moore's	  Law	  applied	  to	  retirement	  savings.	  
Moore’s Law means that today’s Sony Playstation 3 has processing speed as fast as the 
world’s fastest supercomputer in 1996 (Brynjolfsson and Mcafee 2014, 49-50).   Today’s 
iPhone is also faster than a $10 million supercomputer of the 1970s (Ungar 2008, par. 5). 
The second factor, digitized data, has two important properties:  it is non-rival, and 
costs to reproduce and distribute it are negligible.  Non-rival means that something is not 
used up when it gets used (Brynjolfsson and Mcafee 2014, 62), such as when I listen to a 
song on an iPod. 
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The final factor is “recombinant innovation,” which simply means that most 
innovations in the digital age are new combinations of existing innovations, packaged 
together to solve a new problem.  Steven Johnson takes the long view on this same 
“recombinant innovation” concept in his 2014 book, How We Got to Now:  Six Innovations 
That Made the Modern World.  As one example, he starts his story of glassmaking innovation 
back in 1204, when Constantinople fell.  A group of Turkish glassmakers fled to Venice, 
where the townspeople banished them to the island of Murano.  During the 15th century, 
one of these glassmakers, Angelo Barovier, created clear glass by combining seaweed ash with 
molten glass.   Gutenberg produced the printing press in the 1440s, causing literacy rates to 
rise dramatically, and many people realized they were farsighted.  That created demand for 
spectacles, for which, fortunately, there existed clear glass.  Fast forward almost 300 years to 
1887, when an eccentric professor named Charles Vernon Boys wanted to create a very fine 
strand of glass to measure the effects of delicate force on objects.  So, he did what any of us 
would do, and attached molten glass to a crossbow, and then fired a shot across his lab, 
creating a very thin, long strand of clear glass.  Almost 100 years later, Corning advanced 
both Boys’ thin strands of glass and Barovier’s transparency process to create fiber optics.  
The backbone of the global Internet is built out of fiber optic cables (Johnson 2014, 14-31). 
So, if you like your internet connection robust, thank Gutenberg, the bureaucrats of 
Venice, and an eccentric professor with a crossbow.  Innovations build on prior innovation, 
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sometimes a hundred years old.  We all stand on the shoulders of giants.  Please remember 
this the next time you think you invented social networks, or the Internet, or crowdsourcing. 
Frameworks for Innovation Success 
Innovation is more important than ever due to the exponential acceleration of the 
digital era.  How can we ensure our organizations are set up to innovate?  Is there a 
framework we can use to think about that? 
For anyone who dislikes academic frameworks, I sympathize.  Frameworks generally 
consist of a variety of geometric shapes usually accompanied by arrows pointing out some 
interesting bits.  They are often far too complicated to be remembered or useful in the heat 
of a real-world business decision.  Too much time is spent trying to make sure one has filled 
out every box, slot, circle or doo-hickey, resulting in…stuff we already know.  Time that 
could be better spent making something happen.  I come by my aversion to frameworks 
honestly, having spent two years as an associate at McKinsey, the aforementioned consulting 
company.  As author Duff McDonald wrote of McKinsey in his book The Firm, “By the end 
of the 1980s, the firm required that new recruits learn more than a dozen core analytical 
frameworks, ranging from ‘the raider’s perspective’ to return-on-equity trees, business 
systems, industry cost curves, value-delivery systems, economic value to the shareholder, and 
the strategic game board…The real ball-busters…were heavy on the numbers, from cost of 
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capital to returns on all manner of investments” (McDonald 2013, 143-144).  He got that 
right, except it was over 50 frameworks – we had a whole book of frameworks.  On the other 
hand, frameworks are useful for ensuring that one solves a problem or tells a story in a logical 
and complete fashion.  Some of them also help identify key decision-making factors.  I have 
found that the most useful frameworks in a business context are simple, easy to remember, 
and flexible.   
So here I am at Ontario College of Art and Design University (“OCAD U”) writing 
a thesis on innovation and looking for a framework I can stand.  I searched the literature for 
recent innovation frameworks, so that I could contrast them with those of more established 
scholars such as Christensen.  Most recently, my former HBS professor Linda Hill and her 
co-authors have created a new framework for building an innovative culture.  It appealed to 
me for its simplicity, and because the elements of the framework were illustrated with real 
world stories.  According to these authors, in order to build an innovative organization, 
leaders must create an environment in which employees are both willing and able to innovate 
(Hill et al. 2014, 69-70). To create an organization that is willing to innovate, a company 
needs a purpose, shared values, and rules of engagement.   To build an organization able to 
innovate requires three capabilities:  creative abrasion (creating a multitude of options 
through debate and discussion), creative agility (experimenting quickly and changing 
directions as required), and creative resolution (the ability to make integrative decisions that 
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build on the options rather than “either or” decisions that simply pick one) (Hill et al. 2014, 
169).  Below is my drawing of this framework: 
   
Figure	  13	  -­‐	  Author's	  drawing	  of	  Hill	  et	  al's	  Willing	  and	  Able	  framework.	  	  (Hill	  et	  al.,	  2014,	  192) 
This framework is simple and pragmatic enough that I might actually be able to use 
it.  We’ll discuss each element in turn and provide a real-world example to show it in action.  
Purpose 
Let’s review the elements of the “Willing” side of the framework first.  A great 
example of “purpose” comes from Tim Brown’s 2008 article, “Design Thinking.”  According 
to Brown, the purpose of India’s Aravind Eye Care System (one of the world’s largest 
providers of eye care) is to eradicate blindness in India, including among the rural poor (T. 
Brown, 2008, 90).  That is surely a vision that inspires its employees, who provide care to 
more than 2 million patients a year, 60% of whom cannot afford to pay.   
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Shared Values and Rules of Engagement 
Hill and her co-authors use Pixar as an example of a company that emphasized 
“shared values” and “rules of engagement” to create some of the most innovative movie 
experiences ever.  Pixar utilized daily reviews that encouraged individual contributions from 
all members of the film’s team.  Pixar had open and non-hierarchical communication (a 
shared value) – anyone could give the director comments about the production (Hill et al. 
2014, 28).  There was, however, some structure (rules of engagement).  People were 
encouraged to innovate, experiment, and fail – but the film’s release deadline had to be met, 
and financial data such as shots per week were tracked religiously.  In addition, while all 
team members were encouraged to make suggestions and participate in debates, the director 
retained full creative control, making the final decisions (Catmull 2008, 93).  However, 
beyond these guardrails and end goals, structure was used sparingly.  
Creative Abrasion 
Moving on to the “Able” side of Hill’s framework, the need for creative abrasion, or 
rich, diverse ideas competing through discourse and debate (Hill et al. 2014, 121), is well 
established both by other scholars and by real world examples.  Min Basadur, for example, 
emphasizes the need to create intellectual diversity by ensuring teams have a mix of 
generators, conceptualizers, optimizers, and implementers (Basadur, Gelade, and Basadur 
2014, 82-83).   (You may not have heard of this work unless you enjoy perusing scholarly 
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databases for gripping titles such as 
Creative Problem-Solving Process Styles, 
Cognitive Work Demands, and 
Organizational Adaptability).   
 Basadur et al posited that 
organizations that understand this 
Creative Problem Solving Profile 
(“CPSP”) framework would place 
greater value on diversity of thought in 
their organizations, which allows the 
“creative abrasion” Hill refers to in her framework.  Other scholars noting the importance of 
constructive conflict between diverse individuals include Bruce Tuckman, who produced the 
Forming, Storming, Norming, and Performing framework (Tuckman and Jensen 1977, 43) 
to describe effective team dynamics. 
Beyond academic frameworks, there are many stories from digital history that 
demonstrate the importance of intellectual and personality diversity in fostering creative 
abrasion.  For example, in his book The Innovators, Walter Isaacson (2014, 268-281) writes 
about Stewart Brand, an oddball event producer who took LSD and helped create the hippie 
counterculture in California in the late 60s.  He produced the 1966 Trips Festival, hosted by 
Figure	  14	  –	  Author’s	  drawing	  of	  Basadur's	  CPSP	  
framework.	  	  (Basadur	  et	  al.,	  2014,	  82) 
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Ken Kesey, founder of a hippie commune who was out on bail after a drug bust.  It was a 
combination of drugs, music (Big Brother and the Holding Company, the Grateful Dead) 
and technology (strobe lights, sci-fi movies, gadgets, and pinball).  That got the attention of 
Douglas Engelbart, a smart, monotone engineer who “sometimes gave the impression he had 
not been born on this planet” (Isaacson 2014, 275).  Engelbart ran the Augmentation 
Research Center (studying augmented intelligence) just down the street from one of Brand’s 
ventures.  They teamed up in 1968 for a demo of Engelbart’s “oNLine System”, a precursor 
to the personal computer (“PC”) with its mouse, graphics display, document sharing, and 
email capabilities.  The “Mother of all Demos” featured Engelbart’s computer display 
projected on a large screen at a computer conference.  Brand worked the cameras and 
selected images for display on Engelbart’s computer from 30 miles away, connected via 
leased microwave lines.  They collaborated remotely to create and edit a document, embed 
audio and video, and create hypertext links.  The demo was a success and kickstarted the 
development of the PC.  Ken Kesey was even impressed, noting that the personal computer 
was “the next thing after acid.”  (Isaacson 2014, 281) 
Creative abrasion among team members with diverse skill sets and personalities is 
necessary for innovation.  It helps to have a few brainy nerds with questionable personalities.  
It helps to have an oddball or two.  Drugs may or may not be necessary or condoned by the 
human resources department. 
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Creative Agility 
Creative agility is the ability to experiment and use the data from those experiments 
to pivot (shift directions) when needed.  Tim Brown, CEO of award-winning global design 
firm IDEO, promotes this concept using the term “ideation,” (T. Brown 2008, 88-89) 
meaning that designers and makers should rapidly prototype new ideas and get those 
prototypes out into the hands of real users.  Data and observations of potential customers 
actually using the prototypes can often produce “pivots,” or changes in direction as use in the 
“field” is often different than use in the “lab.”  Scholar Peter Senge, author of The Fifth 
Discipline:  The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization, supports the gathering of data 
from real-world experiments.  According to Senge, the discipline of “mental models” is to 
discern (or not) the actual data that supports (or not) the generalizations we have about the 
real world (Senge 1990, 175).  If our mental models aren’t based on real data, we will 
produce products or services that don’t meet real customer needs.   
Examples of real-world pivots abound.  Groupon, the site that issues coupons if a 
certain number of your friends sign up to buy the same product or service, started life as an 
activism site (i.e., schedule a rally of 100 people in the town hall).  Vital Alert 
Communication, a small underground communications company I ran, started life making 
voice-to-voice communications gear for mines, subways, and tunnels.  After numerous tests 
in subways and tunnels, we determined that text-based communication and binary 
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communications (yes/no, on/off) were much more reliable underground, and began 
developing products that emphasized data communication over voice. 
Creative Resolution 
Hill and her co-authors describe creative resolution as integrating ideas to create a 
solution that is better than the alternatives on the table.  Roger Martin, former Dean of the 
Rotman School of Business at the University of Toronto, is often quoted on this topic.  He 
describes the “opposable mind,” which he defines as the ability to hold two conflicting ideas 
in a constructive tension that allows the synthesis of new and superior ideas. The solution 
contains elements of the opposing ideas but is superior to each (Martin 2009, 6). 
The creation of ARPAnet, the predecessor to the internet, provides a real-world 
example of the power of creative resolution and opposable minds.  (ARPA is the Defense 
Department’s Advanced Research Projects Agency).  As described by Walter Isaacson in his 
book, The Innovators (2014, 235-237), Larry Roberts and Bob Taylor invited their fellow 
ARPA researchers to a meeting in 1967, where Roberts described two possibilities for 
creating a shared network of research computers (at the time, computers were only available 
at large government and research institutions, and these computers were not connected to 
one another).  One was a hub and spoke system, with a centralized “big node” that routed 
information, and one was simply a web of equally powerful, decentralized nodes connected 
to each other.   Responding to Roberts’ preferred decentralized network scenario, the other 
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researchers objected that their large computers were already at capacity and could not afford 
the additional “load” of routing information to the right place.  Wes Clark, a Lincoln 
Laboratory researcher, developed an idea superior to either of the alternatives  - use of a 
router.  A router routes data between nodes on a network, based on a standard, pre-
established protocol.  It did the work of moving data between the large research computers, 
which were then able to both retain their full capacity AND be connected to other 
computers in a decentralized network.  This was clearly superior to either of the two 
alternative choices presented to the researchers.  
Innovation Failures 
The previous paragraphs described groups that were successful in creating the 
willingness and ability to innovate.  What happens if an organization does not foster this 
willingness and ability to innovate?  Patrick Lencioni describes it well in his book, The Five 
Dysfunctions of a Team.  He states that the five dysfunctions include a lack of trust, fear of 
conflict, lack of commitment, avoidance of accountability, and inattention to results 
(Lencioni 2014, par. 3).  A fear of conflict prevents creative abrasion, and lack of trust and 
commitment prevent creative resolution.  Avoidance of accountability and inattention to 
results lead to a hesitance to pivot (creative agility) when results indicate a need to do so.  
According to Lencioni, the upshot of the five dysfunctions is a team dominated by status and 
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ego, pursuing ambiguous goals to low standards (and thus results), in an environment of 
artificial harmony.  In short, a team treading water to maintain an unsatisfactory status quo. 
The literature is also full of high profile examples of companies that failed to 
innovate.  Jim Collins, in his book, How the Mighty Fail (2009, 28-29) cites Motorola, 
which in 1995 introduced the StarTac phone, the smallest such phone to date, with a cool 
clamshell design.  The only trouble was, it was analog, and carriers were beginning to 
demand digital.   But Motorola, the market leader, thought that its millions of analog 
customers couldn’t be wrong. They tried to dictate to carriers how much of their sales had to 
be Motorola.  Carriers resisted this arrogance, and Motorola’s share fell from nearly 50% to 
just 17% by 1999 (Collins 2009, 29).  Clay Christensen, in his book The Innovator’s Solution 
(2003, 35-39), describes how integrated steel giants such as Bethlehem Steel were disrupted 
by steel mini-mills.  The mini-mills required considerably less capital investment (they 
simply melted existing scrap metal in electric arc furnaces).  Mini-mill steel was lower quality 
and also 20% lower cost, so mini-mills initially targeted the construction rebar (i.e., steel bars 
that reinforce concrete) market, where fit and finish were less important.  The steel giants did 
not react, as this market was their lowest margin business.  Bethlehem Steel closed its last 
structural beam plant in 1995, conceding to the minimills (Christensen 1997, 91). 
The literature also has stories of once innovative large brands that lost their 
innovation edge, and came back.  Crest, for example, was the market leader in toothpaste 
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until the late 1990s, when it dropped to the #2 slot behind Colgate.  It stormed back in the 
mid-2000s with innovations in teeth whitening and oral health (B. Brown and Anthony 
2011, par. 20).  There is also, of course, Apple, which emerged from near bankruptcy to 
unleash a torrent of innovative “i-products” when Steve Jobs returned to the company after a 
12-year absence in 1997. 
From Economics to Ecosystem – Role of the Leader 
Apple is an example of an organization in which the leader had a disproportionate 
impact on the ability of an organization to innovate.  What is the role of the leader in 
creating an organization that is willing and able to innovate?  During the conference on 
Leadership and Innovation held in Toronto in November 2014, I asked Dr. Hill, the co-
author of Collective Genius, what had been the biggest change in thinking about innovation 
in the last 10 years.  She said, “It is the shift from economics to ecosystem.  20-30 years ago, 
most of the people studying innovation were economists – like Christensen.  They were 
interested in the economic impact of innovation.  Today, it is much more about how to 
create the ecosystem and the culture that supports innovation.”  Leaders seeking to establish 
a culture in which employees are willing to innovate tend to “lead from behind,” as Hill puts 
it. Vineet Nayar, CEO of HCL Industries (an Indian high tech company which successfully 
transitioned from hardware to services) from 2008-2013, says: 
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Leaders must avoid the urge to answer every question or provide a solution to every 
problem.  Instead you must start asking questions, seeing others as the source of 
[innovation] …The greatest impact is that it unleashes the power of the many and 
loosens the stranglehold of the few, thus increasing the speed and quality of 
innovation and decision making...every day.  (Hill et al. 2014, 65) 
 
Stephen Covey, author of Principle-Centered Leadership, described this concept as 
“self-directed work teams” (Covey 1996, par. 3).  Employees on these teams are empowered 
and expected to solve problems, someway, somehow, and thus are both engaged and 
innovative. 
Christensen notes that changes in leadership can result in markedly different 
innovation results, simply based on different problem-solving approaches employed by those 
leaders.  For example, he states that from 1981-1999, Sony did not launch one new 
disruptive business (Christensen 2003, 79-80).  In the early 1980s, founder Akio Morita 
withdrew from day-to-day management of the company to become more active in politics.  
In his place, the company brought in MBAs with sophisticated analytical tools.  These 
analytical MBAs were able to identify some incremental opportunities in existing markets 
(i.e., sustaining innovations), but lacked the disruptive insights from observation and rapid 
prototyping that Morita had championed (Christensen 2003, 79-80). 
Leaders matter.  The role of the leader in a time of exponential acceleration of 
innovation is to create an environment in which all team members are willing and able to 
innovate.  And that requires the leader to have an opposable mind, something that is not yet 
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a staple of MBA training.  Rather than simply choosing between option A or option B based 
on an analysis of the current data, leaders of innovation must seek superior alternatives that 
combine elements of both options.  They also cannot simply assume existing constraints 
(such as battery life, for example) will hold for long in the exponential acceleration of the 
digital age. 
Curry & Hodgson’s Three Horizons Framework 
There’s another framework we need, in addition to “Willing and Able”, in order to 
apply the Dell case to innovation studies.  And yes, I’ve shared my general point of view on 
frameworks.  But this framework is useful for telling stories over time – in this case, the story 
of Dell’s rise, fall, and possible return.   
As we will see in Chapter 5, I used Curry & Hodgson’s Three Horizons method to 
integrate the rich interview and field trip data with available literature and signals about 
future technologies.   This framework, shown in Figure 15, helps scenario builders construct 
a series of plausible futures using three time horizons (Curry and Hodgson 2008, 1).  
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Figure	  15	  -­‐	  Author's	  drawing	  of	  Curry	  &	  Hodgson's	  Three	  Horizons	  scheme.	  	  (Curry	  &	  Hodgson,	  2008,	  2)	  
The First Horizon represents the older system, technology, or culture, which has lost 
fit as the world around it has changed.  The Third Horizon represents the future system, 
culture, or technology, which is a more appropriate response to the changing external 
environment.  There are “weak signals” of the elements of the Third Horizon in the present 
day.  The Second Horizon represents an intermediate space, typically characterized by 
conflict and turmoil. In order to resolve the conflicts of the Second Horizon, managers must 
“see beyond (the) current system, motivated by vision, values, and beliefs” (Hodgson & 
Sharpe, 2007, 140).   The Three Horizons model can be used to describe the present (First 
Horizon) and the future (Second and Third Horizons), as described in “Seeing in Multiple 
Horizons:  Connecting Futures to Strategy,” by Andrew Curry and Anthony Hodgson 
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(Curry and Hodgson 2008, 2-3), or it can be used to describe the past, present, and future 
(Norman 2013, 15).  I have chosen the latter approach, because it is critical to understand 
the culture that made Dell one of the world’s most successful companies in the 1990s in 
order to understand why that risk-taker’s culture is so important to its future.  
Before moving from frameworks to the Dell case study, it’s important to understand 
why large companies like Dell must innovate in the digital age.  There are 125 million small 
and medium enterprises in the world (Kushnir, Mirmulstein, and Ramalho 2010, par. 1). 
Can’t they carry the innovation load, and aren’t they more likely to be less bureaucratic and 
thus more innovative?  Why is it worth studying whether innovation can be renewed in large 
organizations, particularly Dell?
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Chapter Four – Research Question and Methods 
Where Does Innovation Go to Die? 
“This is the time for (IBM CEO Ginny) Rometty to prove wrong the thesis that 
large enterprises have no chance of surviving through innovation,” says Yale’s Jeffrey 
Sonnenfeld, in a recent article in Fortune magazine (Lev-Ram 2014, par. 13).  Scott 
Anthony, of the Harvard Business Review, notes, “Most people continue to believe big 
companies are where innovation goes to die” (Anthony 2014, par. 12).  As early as 1934, 
economist Joseph Schumpeter said,  
…new combinations are, as a rule, embodied, as it were, in new firms which 
generally do not arise out of the old ones but start producing beside them; to keep to 
the example already chosen, in general it is not the owner of stage-coaches who builds 
railroads. (Schumpeter 1934, 66) 
When start-ups like Instagram (2010) and Foursquare (2009) can appear and grow 
to over 1 million users in less than 24 months (Shontell, 2012), lumbering giants like Dell, 
GM, and IBM seem positively anachronistic, throwbacks to an earlier time before mobile 
phones and social media put the customer in control, turned millions into content creators, 
and spawned 13 year old global  pop stars from viral YouTube videos.   My thesis focuses on 
one of these giants, Dell, and answers the research question: 
“What caused Dell’s growth rate and stock price to decline in the mid-2000s, and 
how might Dell thrive once again?” 
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But who cares?  Why does it matter?  It is worthwhile to assess whether large US-
based corporations such as Dell can survive, and indeed, thrive, through innovation because 
a) innovation is vital to prosperity, and North America in particular has fallen behind, b) 
large corporations have access to the capital needed to invest in innovation, and c) large 
corporations have a higher tolerance for risk than smaller companies, simply because they 
have more financial assets with which to absorb failure(s). 
Economic Importance of Innovation 
Innovation is vital to prosperity.  Nobel Laureate Sir Ernest Rutherford once said, 
“Gentlemen, we have run out of money.  It is time to start thinking” (Augustine 2010, vii).  
Schumpeter, in his book, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, identified “creative 
destruction,” or innovation that both creates new companies and destroys old ones, as the 
driving force of capitalism (Schumpeter 1950, 81-86).  According to Schumpeter, this 
creative destruction causes continuous progress and improves standards of living.  
More modern scholars, economists, and business leaders concur with Schumpeter.  
According to a 2005 report called Rising Above the Gathering Storm, prepared for the 
Presidents of the National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, and 
Institute of Medicine, 85% of the increase in per capita income in the US can be attributed 
to disruptive innovation (Augustine 2005, 1).  The Gathering Storm committee, led by 
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former Lockheed Martin CEO Norman Augustine, concluded that the primary driver of the 
future economy and job creation will be innovation, particularly in the sciences and 
engineering (Augustine 2010, 5).  The Gathering Storm report goes on to cite several 
disturbing facts regarding where and how R&D dollars are being invested, notably that a) 
GE now has the majority of its R&D personnel outside the U.S., b) 77% of global firms 
planning to build R&D centers will do so in China or India, and c) U.S. consumers spend 
more on potato chips than the U.S. government spends on energy R&D (Augustine 2010, 
6-11).   
According to Dr. Christensen, innovation must be of the disruptive or “market-
creating” type in order to create jobs.  Disruptive innovations create new classes of customers 
because costs or complexity are driven down so radically that an entirely new class of 
customers can afford the product (i.e., when computing went from “mainframes at millions 
of dollars” to “desktop computers for $2,000,” millions of consumers bought PCs).  He 
states that sustaining innovations have a relatively minor impact on jobs (because existing 
customers simply buy the new product rather than the old product).  Efficiency innovations 
destroy jobs, because they improve processes and worker productivity, meaning fewer 
workers are needed to produce the same goods (Christensen, 2014, par. 11-14). 
If the U.S. does not create a climate that encourages disruptive innovation, I believe 
it will not raise the standard of living for the average American, because it will not create 
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high-wage jobs.  The World Economic Forum (“WEF”) recently released its Global 
Competitiveness Report for 2014-2015, in which the U.S. ranked 3rd, after sliding from 1st 
place in 2009 to 7th place in 2012 (Kolawole, 2012).  In that report, the WEF describes the 
importance of innovation to raising standards of living as follows: 
Although substantial gains can be obtained by improving institutions, building 
infrastructure, reducing macroeconomic instability, or improving human capital, all 
these factors eventually run into diminishing returns. The same is true for the 
efficiency of the labor, financial, and goods markets. In the long run, standards of 
living can be largely enhanced by technological innovation.  (“Methodology: The 12 
pillars of competitiveness,” 2015, par. 29) 
As noted by HBS professors Michael Porter and Jan Rivkin in their report, An 
Economy Doing Half Its Job, the U.S. economy is recovering, in some respects, from the 
financial crisis of 2008-2009.  Corporate profits are rising, as are U.S. stock markets and 
initial public offering (“IPO”) proceeds.  U.S unemployment now stands at 5.7%, down 
from peak unemployment of 10 percent in late 2009 (Meyer 2015, par. 11), but wages have 
not improved, and the labor force participation rate has declined. As Janet Yellen, Federal 
Reserve Chair, noted on March 18, 2015: 
…the labor force participation rate is lower than most estimates of its trend, and 
wage growth remains sluggish, suggesting that some cyclical weakness persists.  
(Meyer 2015, par. 13) 
Yellen noted that the U-6 unemployment rate of 11.3% is at an “abnormally high 
level” and “signifies a weakness that would be good to address” (Meyer, 2015, par. 9).  U-6 is 
a broader measure of unemployment, and includes discouraged workers as well as those 
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working part-time when they would like to be working full-time (Meyer 2015, par. 5).  
Finally, while the unemployment rate has declined, it took over 6 years for the number of 
jobs to return to their 2007 peak (J. Rivkin & Porter, 2014, 3).   Discouraged workers and a 
declining labor participation rate are serious problems for world economies given the need to 
support the bulge of retiring Baby Boomers (De Wulf, 2012) and fund their health care 
costs. 
  The new jobs are not distributed equally among all sectors of the population. In 
addition, many, particularly the young, are “mal-employed”, a term used by Rivkin and 
Porter to describe those who hold jobs that do not require the knowledge and skills 
developed in college (J. Rivkin & Porter, 2014, 24). 
 
Figure	  16	  -­‐	  "Mal-­‐employment"	  rates	  by	  age	  cohort.	  	  Source:	  (Fogg	  &	  Harrington,	  2011,	  57)	  (J.	  Rivkin	  &	  Porter,	  2014,	  25)	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Household incomes have also stagnated.  After adjusting for inflation, the average 
hourly wage for non-management private sector jobs has approximately the same purchasing 
power as it did in 1979 (Desilver, 2014, 5).  The distribution of incomes has also changed.  
Among the bottom 10% of income earners in the U.S., weekly wages have fallen almost 4% 
since 2000.  For the top tier of earners, wages have risen 9.7% (Desilver, 2014).  Why the 
disparity in results between the income tiers, and between rising corporate profits and 
stagnant household incomes?  Christensen argues that it is because we are focused on cost-
reducing efficiency innovation rather than job-creating disruptive innovation.  He states: 
Our current economy, however, has gone off of the rails in large part because we are 
focused almost entirely on efficiency innovations—on streamlining and wringing 
bottom line savings and additional profits out of our existing organizations…As long 
as this continues to happen, we will continue to experience the tremendous chasm 
between capital investment and the creation of meaningful numbers of new jobs and 
especially of highly specialized jobs.  (Nisen, 2012, par. 4-5) 
I believe that if the US wishes to create high-wage jobs and raise the standard of living for all 
Americans, not just a few, it must foster job-creating disruptive innovation. 
Large Corporations and the Propensity to Innovate 
Large corporations have access to the capital needed to invest in innovation.  This 
point was underlined by the near-catastrophic events of 2008-2009.  In 2008, the global 
economy experienced a 100-year flood.  The Great Recession of 2008-2009 was heralded by 
the unprecedented failure of Wall Street firm Lehman Brothers.  That led to a one day loss 
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of over 500 points in the Dow Jones Industrial Average, which presaged a brutal decline of 
almost 50% in major stock averages over the next few months.  Unemployment climbed to 
10%, and the US government had to bail out home lenders Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
(Hausman and Johnston 2014, 2720).  The Great Recession wiped out retirement dreams.  
It also caused an increase in risk aversion among corporations, which began hoarding cash 
(Johnston, 2012, 8).  Banks tightened credit, and U.S. venture capitalists (“VC”) reduced 
financing by 40% following the collapse, from $32.1 billion to $20.4 billion. 
 
Figure	  17	  -­‐	  US	  venture	  capital	  investments	  by	  year,	  1998-­‐2014.	  	  (PriceWaterhouseCoopers,	  2014)	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 Large corporations, by contrast, have significant amounts of cash waiting to be 
deployed.  Compare the balance sheets of America’s large tech giants to the total U.S. 
venture investment of $30 billion in 2013 (the last year for which Dell’s cash balance is 
available).  Microsoft had $84 billion in cash in 2013, Google had $59 billion, Cisco had 
$47 billion, Apple had $41 billion, and Dell had $12 billion (Cherney 2014, 11).  With 
interest rates now near zero, debt financing is also abundant and cheap.  Corporations are 
awash in capital (Bain, 2012, 17) and have greater capacity to innovate than small firms.   
Scholars have found that large companies also have a higher tolerance for risk than 
small companies.  This is counterintuitive to anyone who has worked in these large 
organizations.   However, I believe it reflects the more significant assets large firms have, not 
a more entrepreneurial attitude among executives managing large core businesses.  If 
Corporation X has $50 million in cash and Corporation Y has $250,000, I argue that 
Corporation X’s managers will be more likely to invest $100,000 in a new venture, simply 
because one mistake is not “life threatening” to that corporation.  Research supports this 
view.  For example, Michael Walls and James Dyer found risk tolerance increases with size, 
but at a decreasing rate (Walls and Dyer 1996, 1007).  They note that larger firms have more 
resources to absorb failure, learn from experiments, perfect the innovations of smaller 
companies, and pivot in new directions. Ronald Howard found that corporate risk tolerance 
grew in proportion to financial measures such as sales and income (Howard 1988, 689-690).  
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Other scholars, however, note that there are certain factors that hold big businesses 
back from innovation once they hit a certain scale.  Robert Sutton and Huggy Rao, in their 
2014 book Scaling Up Excellence, cite, for example, the “replica trap,” (Sutton and Rao 2014, 
37) in which large companies assume that an innovation in one location will work across the 
globe.  Sutton and Rao, like Linda Hill, advocate the use of “guardrails” as a way to provide 
local leaders with flexibility to innovate while staying within key constraints.  They also cite 
Jet Blue as an example of how the actions of a few committed employees (“heroes”) to 
delight customers does not scale (Sutton and Rao 2014, 72-78), as JetBlue found out when 
hundreds were stuck on the tarmac on Valentine’s Day 2007 (flight-by-flight interventions 
to get planes airborne no longer worked once JetBlue had 800 flights a day).  Large 
organizations also tend to develop bureaucracies, as is well known.  Sutton and Rao state,  
As organizations and programs expand and age, they often propagate ever more 
convoluted procedures and processes.  Ballooning brigades of administrators must 
justify their existence.  So they busy themselves by writing more rules and requiring 
colleagues to jump through more hoops – stealing bandwidth, effort, and willpower 
from more essential work.  (Sutton and Rao 2014, 105) 
Jim Collins (2009, 63 and 81), in How the Mighty Fall, also describes an obsession with 
growth which sets up a vicious cycle of expectations (and I would add, a lack of time to 
experiment and innovate), a related declining proportion of the right people in key seats, 
problematic leader successions, and an obsession with reorganization and internal issues as 
obstacles that companies face as they try to scale up innovation.  
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In summary, large companies have the power to make significant changes by applying 
their considerable human and financial capital to global problems, if they can navigate 
through the scaling challenges that Collins, Sutton, and Rao describe.  Large firms are more 
resilient than smaller firms, for whom one mistake can be financially fatal.  As Scott Anthony 
notes, “Big companies have the fulcrum. Innovation can be their lever” (Anthony 2014, par. 
15).  That’s why studying how large organizations can regain their innovation edge matters. 
Can Dell Come Back to Innovate Again? 
But why Dell, in particular?  Because Dell, once known for one of the most 
significant innovations in marketing, has been given up for dead by some industry watchers.  
In 1993, BusinessWeek touted Michael Dell as one of the industry’s most innovative 
marketers: 
Dell's formula is elegantly direct: He has cut out the dealers and distributors, designs 
and assembles most of his PCs from off-the-shelf components, and runs a no-frills 
operation whose main focus is customer service. That model has won him kudos 
from across the industry. He may not have the high-tech vision of a Bill Gates or a 
Steve Jobs, but "it is probably true that Michael is the most innovative guy for 
marketing computers in this decade," says Philippe Kahn, chairman of software 
maker Borland International Inc. "He's the quintessential American entrepreneur 
that does something everyone says is impossible." (Forest et al. 1993, par. 4) 
However, Dell’s fortunes shifted dramatically in the mid-2000s.  A 2012 Forbes 
article was titled, “No End in Sight for Dell’s Lost Decade” (Cohan, 2012). The stock 
declined by over 50% from 2003 to 2013.  Market share dropped from 18% in 2005 
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(Shilov, 2005, par. 6) to 12% in 2013 (Sacco, 2013, par. 2).  One interviewee asked, “How 
did Dell go from one of the most admired companies in the world to a cocktail party joke?”  
More importantly, how might it come back? 
Research Methods 
My own history and experience at Dell has inspired and informed this work.  I was 
employed by Dell from 1992-2005, including 7 years at corporate headquarters in Austin.  
During this time I developed relationships with employees at all levels of the organization. 
These relationships benefitted this study, as these (now former) employees were willing to 
speak openly with me about their experiences to create a partial oral history of Dell. 
In an effort to understand Dell’s evolution and answer the research question, I used 
several methods.  I first launched a blog, www.techdisrupters.com, in order to help identify 
former Dell employees who might be willing to talk with me.   
Four bodies of literature were then iteratively explored, including innovation and 
foresight, capital structure and innovation, the digital age, and company cultures. This 
method helped me understand key innovation and foresight frameworks and identify “real 
world” examples from digital history with which to illustrate the frameworks.  I then 
conducted field research, namely 10 expert interviews with former Dell employees and 
partners, as detailed in Appendix C.  The recruitment of these individuals was approved by 
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the university’s Ethics Research Board.  The approval document is included in Appendix A.  
As part of the interview process, participants were asked to sort various cards representing the 
drivers of Dell’s success in the 90s.  This 
stack-ranked “card sort” was then 
supplemented with other questions.  The 
interviews yielded key insights and 
perspectives that informed my analysis, such 
as the impact the pressures of Wall Street had 
on the company.  Once the interviews were complete, I created visual word clouds of the 
interview transcripts.  This helped me to identify key themes, which I then reviewed in the 
context of Hill’s “Willing and Able” framework to identify both success factors and gaps that 
impeded Dell’s ability to innovate. 
I supplemented these interviews with participant observation methods at Dell World 
in Austin from November 4-6, 2014, where I participated in discussions with employees and 
customers in breakout sessions.   This trip was vital in understanding Dell’s new product 
strategy and emphasis on innovation.  Following this trip, I used the Three Horizons 
method to identify possible scenarios and possible future options for Dell. 
During the course of my thesis work, I developed the Intelligent Gambler© 
framework, as discussed further in Chapter 5.  This framework helps companies assess 
Figure	  18	  -­‐	  Card	  sort. 
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investments in a portfolio of new technologies based on the risk associated with the degree of 
difference between the current business and the new business, and also the capital required to 
launch the new business.   An interactive d3.js visualization of Dell’s acquisitions over time, 
arrayed against the Intelligent Gambler© framework, forms the core of my physical 
exhibition.  This visualization can be viewed at	  www.heathersimmons.ca/acquisitions.html.	  	  	  
The d3.js software code and related credits for this visualization, as well as for all information 
visualizations in this paper, can be found at	  https://github.com/heathersimmons/ThesisFinal.	  	  
The visualizations are supplemented by selected video clips from the interviews, which can 
be viewed at	  http://www.heathersimmons.ca/dell.html. 
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Chapter Five – Interview Results and Analysis 
Selected quotes from the interviews are included below, along with my analysis.  The 
analysis is structured according to Curry & Hodgson’s Three Horizons model.  Summary 
conclusions are as follows: 
- During Dell’s First Horizon (roughly 1984-2000), its success was driven by four 
factors:  a) the direct business model, b) entrepreneurial culture and commitment, c) 
risk-taking, and d) leadership. 
- In the Second Horizon (roughly 2001-2012), a combination of a) a leadership shift 
and the development of a more risk-averse management tone and b) the pressures of 
Wall Street (i.e., being a public company), coupled with an overreliance on the 
business model, drove out innovation.  This, in turn, caused a lack of timely 
investment in new and growing product categories such as mobility. 
- Dell’s Third Horizon began in 2013, when it went private.  Dell has reset its 
product strategy to focus on higher growth, higher profit products such as security 
and the cloud.  In order to build that new product mix quickly, it went on a buying 
spree – spending $18 billion on 40 acquisitions in 6 years (“Daily Report: The New 
Dell,” 2014, par. 4).  It has also identified the critical need for innovation and a  
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return to a more entrepreneurial culture.  In short, it has a solid plan to radically 
remake itself as the world’s largest start-up, and now must execute on that plan. 
The First Horizon – Four Advantages 
According to interviewees, the direct business model, entrepreneurial culture and 
employee commitment, risk-taking, speed, and execution, and leadership were the most 
important factors in Dell’s success during its First Horizon.  These four elements created a 
seemingly unstoppable machine that marched to the #1 global market share.   
The Direct Business Model 
Dell’s direct business model was one of the most significant sources of advantage, 
according to interviewees.  As Tom Martin, former Vice President of Marketing, noted, 
“The obvious thing is, Dell had a business model, which led to a structural cost advantage 
that was mathematically significant.  A 10 percent or so cost advantage, in a commodity 
business, is material, especially when you’re purchasing a lot.  If you’re buying scotch tape, 
60 cents vs. 66 cents for a roll at Target does not change the purchase decision.  If you are 
spending $60 million, 10 percent is material.  And it was structural, so it was hard to copy – 
because competitors had other business models, and felt that they had to abandon those 
models in order to pursue the direct model.   And the gap out in cashflow in that transition 
was too big, so they couldn’t, or thought they couldn’t, copy it.”  Bill Sharpe, the former 
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CEO of Sharpe Blackmore, concurs: “The business model was the #1 driver of success.  It 
was so disruptive.  It defied logic.  Without the original business model and the disruption it 
caused, you’d never have had a Dell – you would have never gotten off the ground.”  
Michael Dell believed strong customer relationships and the free flow of information 
were the most valuable benefits of the direct model (Payne and Allen 1999, 3).  While Dell 
has shifted its business model strategy to include the channel so that it may effectively target 
small to mid-size businesses, and other competitors have increased direct sales, Dell still sells 
about 65% of its products directly (Burke, 2014, par. 6) far more than other competitors.   
 
Figure	  19	  -­‐	  Direct	  sales	  percentage.	  (Kraemer	  &	  Dedrick,	  2002,	  1)(Lawrentz	  2013,	  par.	  6)(Burke	  2014,	  par.	  6)(Schultz	  1999,	  par.	  23)	  
Without the direct business model, Dell would not have had a double-digit cost 
advantage or direct relationships with customers.  The model was crucial to Dell’s success. 
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Entrepreneurial Culture and Commitment 
Entrepreneurial culture and commitment drove the relentless execution that 
continually enhanced the advantages of the direct model.  In Hill’s terms, entrepreneurialism 
and commitment were two of Dell employees’ shared values. 
As one employee who worked in Corporate Services said, “The direct business model 
could have been anything – jeans that zip up in the back, whatever.  If you have leadership 
and employee commitment, you can do anything.  Each quarter, the Dell leadership team 
would figure out exactly what we needed to do this quarter, or for the next two quarters.  
They would make it absolutely clear, we would focus on that and we would just go fucking 
do it.  And that’s exactly what would happen.  There was leadership, and employee 
commitment, and people getting it done.”  Similarly, Indraj Gill, a former marketing 
director in Asia Pacific and North America, says, “Dell could have been built on selling pink 
Cadillacs – it was the entrepreneurial culture that made it work.  And the leadership.  
Culture is #1 because that was what it was all about.  You don’t stay until 3:00 in the 
morning doing a price move just for money.  That level of commitment doesn’t happen for 
just a job.  There is a culture of rewarding, intangibly and tangibly, risk-taking.  Just do it. 
We all gave of ourselves.   This culture came from Joel Kocher.  It started from the top.  The 
culture wasn’t formalized.  It was there because of certain individuals.”   The relative youth 
of Dell employees was also a factor in the amount of hours employees were able to put in.  In 
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1993, the average age of a Dell employee was 28, the same age as Michael himself (Forest et 
al. 1993, par. 21).  As one former employee notes, “We just did what it took to get it done.  
We’d work 12-hour days, and then go to Trudy’s for drinks and dancing, then get up at 6 
a.m. and do it all again. We worked really hard.  And played hard.  One of our Christmas 
parties in the late 80s was held at the Frank Erwin Center, in Austin, a huge arena.  We all 
still remember that party.” 
As former marketing and product 
development director Pamposh Zutshi said, 
“We were working 16-17 hours a day, and not 
feeling tired at the end of it.  That was due to 
the employee commitment, and the leadership.  
There was such alignment between the top 
levels and the front line employees.   We were 
very aligned – amazingly aligned, actually.”  
While some might say this was an 
environment ripe for burnout, entrepreneurial 
employees knew that “start-ups” required hard 
work.  They loved being the underdogs to the  	    
Figure	  20	  -­‐	  Dell	  holiday	  party	  invitation	  from	  the	  
late	  80s. 
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“corporate suits” just down the road in Houston (Compaq, which had the #1 market share), 
and knew it would be difficult to get the level of responsibility they had at such a young age, 
anywhere else in the Fortune 500.   
We also used humour to break the tension.  During one quarter, when the Americas 
corporate desktops team was tasked with selling 195,000 desktops (nearly 50% year-on-year 
growth in a market growing in the low teens), our marketing team repeatedly voiced their 
concerns that this goal was unattainable. I responded, “My mom could hit that number, if 
she only came in on Tuesdays. And only worked at lunch hour.”  Team member Indraj Gill 
snuck into my office one day after the quarter ended, took a photo from my desk, and came 
back with some t-shirts for the team.  The front and back of that t-shirt looked like this: 
      
Figure	  21	  -­‐	  Front	  and	  back	  of	  desktop	  team’s	  t-­‐shirt,	  mid-­‐90s.	  
Winning also inspired a lot of hard work. 
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A Corporate Services director who worked at Dell in the early 2000s also notes that 
this level of employee commitment was not driven purely by financial incentives.  She says, 
“If I were hiring today, I’d look for people with a bias towards action, who were 
collaborative, and could learn on the fly.  They have to have that commitment, and that is 
such a tough thing to test for.  A lot of people are just looking for the next rung up, the next 
job, the next stock options.  Dell was successful because people believed in it.  People focused 
more on their jobs than the stock options.  There was a difference, because the people that 
came in, the strategic guys, they all said, what can you do for me in stock options?  And 
people like (names a number of engineers who had been there since the 90s), were the guys 
that didn’t really care about that.  And they were the guys working 16 to 18-hour days.” 
In sum, Dell’s entrepreneurial culture included shared values of commitment, a bias 
towards action, and clear communication.  Employees were aligned around a common 
purpose:  to topple Compaq for the #1 market share.  This helped create an environment in 
which employees were willing to innovate. 
Risk-taking, Speed, and Execution 
Risk-taking, speed and execution were also important elements in Dell’s success.  
According to interview participants, part of this was driven by the company’s non-
hierarchical management structure, and part of it was ingrained in the people Dell hired, 
who preferred to beg forgiveness rather than ask permission in the early days.  A former 
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director of operations described the culture in the early 90s as,  “Complete cowboy 
management.  I didn’t have to talk to my boss about anything, because Michael was always 
in my office.  It was ready, fire, aim.  That worked where you had the right people.”  Or as 
an operations manager who was hired in the 80s put it, “The entire North American 
materials planning team at the time was just a few people.  The materials and production 
planning teams would get together every morning, and figure out what parts we had on hand 
and what we could get hold of that morning.   Then, we’d figure out what we could build, 
and tell the sales guys to go sell that.  You just figured it out, and you never asked permission 
in the beginning.  Then, when we did start to get some structure, there was so much trust 
between the bosses and the workers.  Approvals were fast.”  (Basadur might observe that Dell 
had an abundance of implementers in the early days). 
This rapid-fire execution was highly data-driven, which created some guardrails or 
rules of engagement while allowing the company to pivot quickly (creative agility).  Dell had 
an advantage in this area – because it sold direct, it had data about what its customers 
bought, how many times they called, what ads they responded to, and how often their 
machines broke.  As Bill Sharpe says, “Dell was doing big data way before everyone else, and 
that was an advantage.  We started building an analytical model with feeds from Dell’s call 
center that tracked variables like spend, region, colour, ad placement, and the like, and then 
ran a regression that predicted the number of phone calls you’d get.  This allowed us to 
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quickly identify what was working and not, and constantly refine and redeploy the budget.   
We were at least 10 years ahead of our time on Big Data.  The critical thing was, it was 
highly, highly actionable.  And the competition literally could not keep up.” 
In the early days, partners such as Bill Sharpe also noted the company’s willingness to 
take risks (a shared value):  “A lot of other clients go on autopilot – i.e., ‘let’s run TV for 13 
weeks and then get ready for spring season. ‘  They are not out there actively saying ‘what 
can we do to change things?’  And so what happened was, Dell significantly unbalanced the 
competition.  The competition was too legacy bound, too enterprise bound, and they had no 
analytics.  All they started to do was follow what we were doing.  IBM started running ads 
that looked virtually the same.  So we wrote the president of IBM Canada a letter saying, 
‘You know what, we can save you a lot of money.  Just have us do your ads, because we have 
all the templates, and your ads are so similar to ours.  You won’t have to pay your expensive 
agency.’  We never got a response.” 
One example of this risk-taking and related speed of execution was the company’s 
handling of the Intel floating point unit crisis of 1994.   I was 31, and had just been 
promoted to marketing director for North American corporate desktops, Dell’s largest 
product business.  I had uncharacteristically decided to actually take the entire Thanksgiving 
holiday off.  (Within about 6 months of my joining Dell, my workaholism was legendary, as  
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shown in this Powerpoint presentation slide that my boss, Tom Martin, jokingly put up in 
April 1993, ostensibly to explain how marketing projects would be resourced): 
 
Figure	  22	  -­‐	  Tom	  Martin's	  presentation	  to	  the	  marketing	  group,	  April	  1993.	  
I’d driven 3 hours from Austin to Dallas to have dinner with a friend and was just 
sitting down to eat my turkey dinner when my phone rang.   It was Tom, explaining that 
there was a crisis associated with Intel and that he needed me to come back to Austin that 
very day.  The New York Times had just run an article detailing how the Pentium chip 
miscalculated very large numbers (Markoff 2014, 2).  The flaw affected all of the millions of 
Pentium computers already shipped.  Dell was the leader in Pentium chip shipments.  It was 
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the only time I’d ever heard Tom sound worried.  Intel, a $10 billion company at the time, 
would eventually take a $475 million charge to earnings, the equivalent of half a year’s R&D 
budget, related to the crisis (Pandya and Shell 2005, 5). 
That evening at 6 pm I was in his office in Austin, and we spent 4 hours discussing a 
possible plan of attack.  The next morning, about 15 Dell employees, including me, a 
director of operations, and Jeff Clarke (then director of desktop engineering and now Vice-
Chairman of Dell), met in a conference room.   Whenever we were gathered in a room 
together, it usually meant something serious had hit the fan.  The former director of 
operations described why the three of us were in the room for most major crises of the 90s:   
“We shared a common trait – we could see the solution to a problem.  ‘Houston, we have a 
problem.’  We didn’t need to think about it for a long time – just do it.   Dell was lucky 
from that standpoint – it had people who could look at big problems, and say the solution is 
this and this – and if we execute to that, we’ll be alright.  Dell let that talent rise.”  
In Basadur’s terms, the problem had found us.  It was time to generate ideas, evaluate 
alternatives, and plan – at light speed.  I grabbed a whiteboard marker, and started scribbling 
ideas as people threw them out.  About 3 hours later, we had figured out that the key was, 
first, to educate customers. This error only affected those doing very complex calculations, 
such as extremely precise science and engineering applications (Markoff 2014, 5).  The 
typical customer would never see it.  Second, we would provide those customers who 
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believed they were affected with a field-replaceable chip module.  Those customers affected 
by the flaw were likely to be technically sophisticated enough to replace the chip module 
themselves. This would save considerably on the cost of shipping whole units from the 
customer to Dell and back.  Third, for customers unable to swap out the chipset themselves 
but still concerned about the impact of the error, we would ship the computer to a Dell 
facility, make the repair in the facility, and ship it back to customers.   
With those decisions made, I suggested to the team that our top priority had to be 
running the numbers so that we could size the financial impact and put it in front of Mort 
Topfer, Dell’s Vice-Chairman, for approval.  At that point, an experienced manager (whom I 
did not yet know) raised his hand and politely but firmly said, “Excuse me, Heather.  With 
all due respect, running the numbers to get Mort’s approval is not our top priority.  I have 
hundreds of tech support reps on the phones.  And they are getting a thousand calls a day 
about this problem.  They cannot just shit an answer.  We have to tell them what to say.”  
And thus was I introduced to the extremely colorful and usually correct Director of 
Technical Support, Steve Smith, a two-time Purple Heart in Vietnam who looked out for his 
people and commanded the respect of all he led.  Steve was right, and his direction would 
prove to be critical in Dell’s handling of the crisis.   Dell was one of the first to have a 
response for customers.  Those customers were particularly panicked since Intel insisted, 
right up until December 20, 1994 (Emery, 1996), that the flaw was minor and they would 
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only replace chipsets, at their discretion, once they (Intel) had interviewed customers to 
determine if they actually needed such a replacement.  This was even after IBM had deemed 
the problem serious enough that it halted all shipments of computers with Pentium-based 
processors on December 12, 1994 (Emery, 1996). 
But the question was, what were we actually going to tell the reps to say?  That would 
impact the financials, and vice versa.  Fortunately, Kellie Leonard, a member of the public 
relations (“PR”) team who looked so young I was sure she was an intern, volunteered to 
write the scripts and craft any messages for the media.  On day one, Kellie produced the 
simplest of messages, which was that Dell would take care of their customers, including 
replacing their chipsets if customers so desired.  This message did a lot to calm the frenzy of 
customers, who weren’t interested in Intel’s description of the problem and simply wanted a 
correct chip in place of the flawed one they had. The only trouble was, Intel at the time had 
not committed any dollars to help manufacturers such as Dell fund the replacements.  As far 
as we knew, Dell could be on the hook for the full repair.   
The same day, I calculated the cost to Dell, debated whether we could afford to use 
the blanket statement “we will take care of our customers” with the PR team, and walked 
into Mort Topfer’s office with the head of PR.  I told him that based on my calculations we 
could not afford to lead with the blanket statement that we would take care of customers.  
“Mort, if we do that, the costs could be huge.  We could go out of business.”  I started to 
Dell’s Third Horizon: 
The Innovation Imperative Heather Simmons 
	  
	   64	  
explain the calculations on the spreadsheet I’d brought with me.  He glanced for a moment 
at the spreadsheet, then looked up and said, “I’m sure these calculations are correct.  And if 
we don’t take care of our customers, we’ll go out of business anyway.”   Decision made.  As 
we were leaving, Mort called me back in to his office and added, “Heather, you know that 
number you showed me?  I need you to get it down to about a tenth of that.”  Of course.  
In any event, in less than 5 minutes, we went with Kellie’s script, and avoided the PR 
issues that subsequently ensued for Intel.   Also, because our opening line was “We will take 
care of our customers,” that took a lot of the anxiety out of the situation for those customers, 
who were then able to listen rationally to our description of the problem and who was likely 
to be affected by it.  Most customers concluded it wasn’t them.  I walked the technical 
support floor the next day, and to a person, every rep was following Kellie’s script, exactly.  
Steve Smith was in the house. 
Dell had assessed the Pentium chip problem, developed a technical solution, created 
communications scripts, trained support reps, run the numbers, and gotten approval for the 
plan, all before competitors returned from the Thanksgiving holiday.   But we weren’t done 
yet.  Because Dell had very low inventory levels, it didn’t have many systems with the flawed 
chips on hand.   This created an opportunity to demonstrate the power of the direct model. 
On the Friday before Christmas in 1994, about ten Dell marketing leaders held a 
conference call.  I was the only one still in Austin, as everyone else had left for vacation.  
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Tom Martin asked me, “Heather, what do you think?  Do we have the updated chips in all 
our product?”  Earlier that day, I had spoken with a senior manufacturing director, who told 
me he was 95% sure they had gotten all of the flawed chips out of inventory, and the math 
associated with our low inventory levels certainly said that was likely.  I relayed that to the 
team, and we decided to run an ad guaranteeing that we had the clean chips.  The following 
full page ad ran in the Wall Street Journal on January 4, 1995, and this is all it said: 
Dell’s rapid decision-making and 
calculated risk-taking turned the Pentium 
chip flaw into a textbook example of PR 
crisis management, and a marketing coup.  
It demonstrated the advantages of Dell’s 
model and its ability to execute at great 
speed.  More importantly, it strengthened 
relationships and enhanced Dell’s 
reputation.  And the plan had not broken 
the bank:  financial costs were about 10 
percent of what I had calculated, thanks largely to effective customer communication. 
A former Corporate Services director sums it up, “A lot of companies can commit to 
a strategy, but they don’t know how to execute it.  Dell actually knew how to execute what 
Figure	  23	  -­‐	  Dell's	  ad	  in	  the	  Wall	  Street	  Journal,	  January	  
4,	  1995.	  	  Source:	  	  Photo	  of	  ad	  from	  author’s	  collection. 
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they put forward.  A lot of people put pretty plans in place, but they don’t know how to 
execute.  Dell did.” 
Risk-taking was one of Dell’s core shared values in its First Horizon.  Rapid-fire, data-
driven decision-making and a strong focus on execution helped create creative agility in the 
face of numerous opportunities and challenges. 
Leadership 
The final contributor to Dell’s success in the 90s, according to participants, was 
leadership, starting at the top.  As one former manager notes, “I hate those gross displays of 
power.  And that was something I appreciated about Michael Dell.  He was not a ‘kiss my 
ring’ kind of guy.  He never screamed at anyone.”  Michael was known for rolling up his 
sleeves, and for his informal conversations with employees.  An operations manager describes 
her first meeting with Michael:   “I was in a meeting, and we were talking about hard drives.  
Suddenly, this guy who looks like he’s 15 starts reeling off the specs of all the hard drives, the 
delivery times, and the prices.  With no notes.   I kept leaning further and further forward 
across the table, straining to see his nametag, wondering who this young genius was.  Finally, 
I read it – Michael.  At that point I realized that ‘Michael’ was the CEO of the company, 
and he was now looking at ME quizzically, wondering why I was staring at him.”   
A former Corporate Communications manager recalls Michael’s focus on the details.  
She says, “One day I answered my phone, and heard, ‘Hi, this is Michael.’  I said, ‘Michael 
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who?’  There was a pause, and I said, ‘You mean the Michael who signs my paycheques?’  He 
said, ‘That’s the one.’  He was calling to make sure I had taken out a line in a press release we 
had written.” 
A former marketing director recalls, “Michael was very accessible in the early days.  
He was in all our quarterly marketing meetings, and he knew my name, even though I was a 
very junior employee.  We all felt very safe bringing up ideas and issues with him.  Some of 
the other execs they brought in later, you didn’t really want to run into them in the hall.” 
Michael was also known for his humour.  The former operations director recalls his 
first meeting with Michael:  “ My first meeting with Michael, we’re sitting in the 9th floor 
conference room.  And he said anytime you have to run down to accounting to get a vendor 
paid and you’re selling furniture out of the lobby, it’s not looking good.”  (The former 
Corporate Communications manager also remembers those days, noting, “We were literally 
selling these really nice Herman Miller bookshelves and tables out the back door to raise cash 
in the early 90s.”) 
Michael also cared about the people he worked with.  In 2000, on my last day before 
I left on my first maternity leave, my assistant came around the corner of my cube, eyes as 
big as saucers.  “Someone claiming to be Michael Dell is on the phone.  Do you want to talk 
to him?”  She put him through, and Michael told me that he just wanted to wish me well 
with the pregnancy, and that he really hoped I’d come back to Dell at the end of my leave. 
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This intense, smart, and committed leadership extended beyond Michael Dell.  As 
former marketing director Indraj Gill put it, “I used to go to Tom’s office for a price move, 
and after an hour I’d be spent.  Tom Martin was one of the top 5 reasons we succeeded.  He 
was so smart.  Mort, Tom Meredith (former CFO), Michael, Joel were also key.”  There 
were other well-respected leaders who valued risk-taking and execution, including then-
product engineering director (and now Vice-Chairman) Jeff Clarke.   A former Corporate 
Services director notes, “Jeff was hell on wheels, and he was a pied piper.  He was all about 
execution, but he also cared deeply about the people, the products, and the company.  He 
was bright, caring, and articulate.  He had a phrase, ‘Not execution.  Flawless execution.’” 
In Dell’s First Horizon, accessible leadership helped speed decision-making and rapid 
execution, a key shared value in Dell’s early culture.  The lack of hierarchy minimized 
guardrails or rules of engagement. 
The Second Horizon – Business Model, Culture Shift and Wall Street 
Overreliance on the Business Model 
 Dell’s business model advantage and risk-taker’s culture was the stuff of business 
school legend.  But, during Dell’s Second Horizon from roughly 2001-2012, it became a 
double-edged sword.    Because of the focus on improving on the model, the Dell team did 
not spend enough time on what Hill terms creative abrasion and creative resolution – 
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encouraging and debating new ideas, then being patient enough to hold those ideas in 
creative tension rather than simply picking between one suboptimal option or another.  The 
former operations director put it simply,  “We were so good at execution, we didn’t have as 
much time for innovation.”  Tom Martin notes, “From 1990-1993, we spent the time to 
understand that the business model was our advantage, the asset we had.  Then we worked 
very hard to come up with the executional approach that was consistent with that advantage.  
The culture you build to focus on executing on a decades-long advantage turns out to 
probably be inimical to innovation.  So you have an asset, you work to create tens of 
thousands of people who are good at executing on that advantage.  And then that advantage 
goes away.  So you now you have a culture that is good at executing on a cost advantage.  
But that culture is not very good at changing the game.  What we didn’t have was a view to 
‘what is a game changer that could kill us?’  We really didn’t have conversations about that.  
And there was an element of the culture that actively looked down its nose at the 
conversation about ‘could there be a major shift that would really change things?’”  During 
the time period Tom describes, there was little scenario planning.   Instead, employees 
focused on executing on the company’s striking advantage, the direct model. 
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The former operations director also believes that Dell should have debated whether 
changes to its business model were required earlier in the game:  “In the 90s, Scott Flaig 
(SVP Operations) pulled all 2,000 people in operations together and said, we’re a 
distributor.  Lots of people looked at him funny, because they thought we were a 
manufacturer.  But if you switch to thinking about being a distributor, then it really doesn’t 
matter where you build it.  I do think maybe we took that a bit too far – which is why, at 
$60 billion, this is a tougher company to run.  Direct became ubiquitous when the internet 
came on – there were much lower barriers to entry.  Amazon has done the direct model well.  
You shop there because you can get anything there, delivered when they say.  And you totally 
trust them. We were so narrowly focused on the distribution model – we applied it to 
servers, to workstations.  We did not spend enough time on think tank level.  This model 
has a bottom to it.  First, the industry consolidated.  Then, the low cost Asian manufacturers 
jumped in – Acer, Lenovo.  Then the South Koreans – Samsung.  And the South Koreans 
have always been good at distribution.”  
The relentless reliance on the business model in the mid-2000s dampened 
innovation.  A former marketing director says, “Another executive told me how he’d propose 
something, and be told, ‘No, stick to the model.  Don’t deviate from the model.’  What kind 
of empowerment was that?  It drove out innovation.”  Dell’s overreliance on its business 
model and its pace of execution reduced creative abrasion and prevented creative resolution.   
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Leadership and Culture Changes  
During the Second Horizon, Dell’s leadership shifted. Asked what the #1 factor was 
in Dell’s decline beginning in the mid-2000s, a former Corporate Services director said, 
“Michael Dell pulled himself out of the day-to-day operations.  He thought he had enough 
players in place, but you had people who didn’t really care about Dell.  He stepped out.  
That was probably the biggest factor.”    
Executive succession is common, healthy, and at some point inevitable.  However, in 
the mid-2000s, Dell’s leadership changes were also accompanied by changes in culture and 
shared values as employee headcount nearly doubled in three years.  These new employees 
brought in a very different problem-solving approach, different shared values, and new 
processes and rules of engagement.  The conflict between these new employees and the 
entrepreneurial types who drove its first two decades, coupled with the shift in leadership, 
significantly changed the company’s culture and appetite for risk-taking. 
Michael has always brought in people with different skill sets to help him.  For 
example, from 1986-1990, Lee Walker, a venture capitalist, served as President.  Former 
Motorola executive Mort Topfer was Vice Chairman of Dell from 1994-1999.  These other 
leaders brought skills that were complementary to Michael’s vision and marketing talent.  
But Michael was always co-CEO or part of the “office of the CEO,” providing a crucial link 
to Dell’s entrepreneurial shared values of risk-taking, speed, and execution. 
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In July 2004, Dell elevated former Bain consultant Kevin Rollins to sole CEO, and 
Michael Dell became chairman.  Rollins had joined Dell in 1996 when Dell’s sales were 
about $5 billion.   He became President of Dell Americas later that year.  Rollins and 
Michael Dell shared a glass-partitioned office until Rollins resigned in January 2007 (when 
Dell revenues were over $55 billion).  Results from this 2003-2006 period are shown below 
(“CAGR” refers to compound annual growth rate), with adjacent periods for comparison. 
 1991-2003 2003-2006 2006-2012* 
Dell Revenue CAGR 37.7% 11.6% -.1% 
Dell Net Income CAGR 38.9% -.5% -1.4% 
PC Industry Unit CAGR 16.0% 14.4% 7.3% 
Dell Unit CAGR 41.2% 14.8% -.2% 
Dell Multiple of Industry Growth 2.6X 1.0X NM** 
End of Period Market Share 16.9% 17.1% 11.1% 
End of Period Employees 46,000 91,500 111,300 
Source:  Dell annual reports, Gartner, Dataquest and International Data Corporation (“IDC”), (Noam, 2009, 
194), (Juliussen, 2010, par. 3) and author analysis. 
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Note:  Dell’s fiscal year end is January 31.  Therefore, the Dell data for revenues, net income, and employees 
for “2003-2006” represents the period from January 31, 2004 through January 31, 2007, and so on.  All other 
figures are as of December 31 of the noted year. 
* Dell went private in October 2013.  Therefore, 2012 is the last full year for which results are available.  
** Not meaningful.  Dell’s unit growth was slightly negative during this period, against a PC industry growth of 
about 7%.   
By the mid-2000s, the personal computer industry was becoming a tougher place to 
operate in, especially for Dell.  Growth had begun to slow, except in Asia, where the direct 
model had less traction.  In 2008, just 15% of desktop PCs were sold via the direct channel 
in Asia (excluding Japan), compared to 41% in the U.S. (J. W. Rivkin 2010, 19).  PC prices 
and margins also declined as the industry consolidated (HP bought Compaq in 2001, 
Lenovo bought IBM’s PC business in 2004, and Acer bought Gateway in 2007) and low-
cost Asian manufacturers entered the industry.   Asian manufacturers had labour costs that 
were about 80% lower than costs in the US and Europe (International Comparisons of Hourly 
Compensation Costs in Manufacturing, 2014).  In addition, the growth of smaller, less 
configurable mobile devices such as laptops and smartphones led to a declining value for 
customized PCs (Collis, Yoffie, and Shaffer 2013, 2).  Finally, the driver of innovation and 
growth shifted from the corporation to the consumer (Lawton 2006, 5), a segment which 
represented just 15% of Dell’s sales, compared to 30% for HP (Lawton 2006, 8).   This shift 
to the consumer also led to a greater focus on design and retail sales, neither of which were 
Dell’s strengths (Lawton 2006, 5).   Dell’s consumer mix over time is shown in Figure 24. 
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Figure	  24	  -­‐	  Dell's	  mix	  of	  consumer	  vs.	  enterprise	  revenues.	  	  For	  this	  chart,	  “enterprise”	  refers	  to	  
business,	  government,	  and	  education	  accounts.	  	  Note:	  	  Dell’s	  fiscal	  year	  ends	  January	  31.	  	  Therefore,	  
Dell’s	  2007	  consumer	  mix	  of	  19%,	  as	  shown	  above,	  represents	  revenue	  mix	  for	  the	  fiscal	  year	  ended	  
January	  31,	  2008,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  Source:	  	  Annual	  reports.	  
It was a tough hand to play.  Industry growth rates continued to drop as more 
smartphones and tablets were introduced.  However, Dell’s growth slowed even more 
dramatically, dropping from 2.6X the industry growth rate to 1X the industry growth rate.  
In 2007, HP surpassed Dell as the PC industry unit market share leader (Kitagawa 2008, 
par. 4).  Dell’s revenue and net income growth also slowed significantly, and Dell repeatedly 
missed analysts’ earnings expectations (Frei and Harris-Van Keuren 2007, 3).   Beyond 
revenue and net income growth, other metrics suffered as well.  A drive to cut costs by 
staffing U.S. call centers with temporary employees led to a decline in Dell’s U.S. consumer 
customer satisfaction ratings from 79 (in 2004) to 74 (in 2005), the steepest decline in the 
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industry (Lee 2006, par. 3).  Dell recalled 4.1 million laptops with defective Sony-made 
batteries, but not before internet videos of flaming laptops made Dell a reluctant internet 
sensation (J. W. Rivkin 2010, 13).  Some criticized Dell for being slow to offer faster and 
cheaper AMD processors (chips) in addition to Intel chips (J. W. Rivkin 2010, 13).  These 
factors influenced Dell’s stock price relative to competitors, as shown below in Figure 25 (the 
stock price at December 31, 2003 is used as the base price and set to 100% for all 
competitors): 
 
Figure	  25	  -­‐	  Stock	  price	  by	  competitor.	  	  Stock	  price	  as	  of	  December	  31,	  2003	  used	  as	  base	  and	  set	  to	  100%	  
for	  all	  competitors.	  	  All	  data	  are	  as	  of	  December	  31	  of	  the	  noted	  year.	  	  Source:	  	  (“Dell	  closing	  costs,”	  2015),	  
Google	  Finance,	  Yahoo	  Finance.	  
During this time, Rollins was instrumental in helping Dell put in place the 
infrastructure required of a mature $50 billion company.  A former Corporate 
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Communications manager notes, “Before Kevin got there, we were always rounding the 
corner on three wheels at a hundred miles an hour.  He made sure we hired enough people 
that the wheels did not fall off.”  As noted above, Dell almost doubled its employee count 
between the end of 2003 and the end of 2006, from 46,000 to 91,500.  Many ex-consultants 
from Bain, McKinsey, and other shops were hired during this period.  By the time I returned 
to Austin in 1999, following a two-year assignment in Toronto, it seemed like you couldn’t 
swing a slinky without hitting a former consultant.  They were everywhere, and they brought 
a significantly different perspective than the largely entrepreneurial types who drove Dell’s 
first two decades. 
The influx of Ivy League-educated, highly analytical consultants helped Dell think 
about strategy, not just execution.  “That was a good thing Michael did – bringing Bain in – 
they brought visionary talent.  We were so focused on execution – we needed another layer 
to define what the strategy was.   Kevin Rollins, for example, got us out of retail – because of 
the channel conflict,” noted a former operations director.   The former consultants also 
developed some of the analytical models that capitalized on Dell’s advantage in having direct 
data about the customer.    
But the consultants also brought a strong process orientation, a focus on cost-cutting, 
and a seemingly endless quest for data that was antithetical to Dell’s “risk-taker’s” mentality.   
In addition, the consultants brought a very consistent background and rigorous approach to 
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solving problems (in contrast to the fast-moving implementers populating the company at 
the time).   I worked at consulting company McKinsey & Co. from 1990-1992, with some 
of the smartest people I’ve ever met (some with arrogance to match).  At McKinsey and 
other firms, the quest for the “right answer” is paramount, and pursued with relentless vigor 
and, sometimes, a degree of intellectual arrogance.  As McKinsey partner Pete Walker noted 
in a 1993 Fortune article, “It’s almost never that we fail because we come up with the wrong 
answer.  We fail because we don’t properly bring along management.  And if the company 
just doesn’t have the horses, there are limits to what we can do.” (Huey, 1993)  Oh my.   
Typical McKinsey studies, predicated on an exhaustive problem-solving approach, 
could last 2-12 months.  This works in some industries, but not in high tech, where Moore’s 
Law rules.  Wait 6 months to make a decision, and you could miss most of a product cycle.   
Former product marketing director Pamposh Zutshi describes the impact of the 
consultants’ quest for more data as follows:  “I think a large part of it is:  at the director level, 
you had a lot of people like me, from the 90s, who believed in just getting out there and 
getting it done.  Then, in the 2000s, a layer was added between the director and the GM – 
the VP Marketing.  And almost all of those new VPs were former consultants.  Some of the 
consultants Dell hired were like former 777 pilots who are used to all their fancy 
instruments.  So we brought them in and put them in a really fast Cessna with an altimeter.  
As the plane starts diving toward the ground, these guys are screaming, ‘Where are my 
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instruments, I need my instruments!’  Meanwhile, the simple altimeter clearly tells them they 
are nosediving and should pull up on the stick.  In the 2000s, it was all about the quest for 
the perfect data.  I always remember you telling me that we will never have all the data, and 
shouldn’t wait for it.”  Bill Sharpe notes, “Dell had a split personality back in the mid 1990s.  
It was, on one hand, a profoundly sales driven culture – lots of hyper sales guys.  But there 
were always consultants, also, throughout the time I worked with Dell.  Ex-McKinsey, Ex-
Bain, etc., etc.  Consultants who tended to think a lot and didn’t do much.  There were 
more consultants over time.  And consultants who moved into marketing who never should 
have been there.   I had a Dell marketing guy (we’ll call him John) who was a former 
consultant come to me years after we’d worked together.  John told me, ‘I was uninformed 
about marketing.  Marketing always has to push forward, to go.  Whereas I was always saying 
no, stop, prove it to me.’”  Sharpe continues, “This, to me, was the timeframe when Dell lost 
its way.  That’s not the way marketing works.  You have to test, refine, go.”  Indeed, Roger 
Martin, a former consultant himself, says that the two words which will kill innovation are 
“prove it.” 
There is no data about how a genuinely new idea will interact with the world in 
advance of said new idea actually interacting with the world. Therefore there is no 
way to prove it will work in advance. (Martin 2014, par. 2) 
A former Corporate Services director describes the impact of the massive influx of 
consultants on Dell’s culture:  “During 1999, we were bringing on thousands of people.  
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Dell knew they were having difficulties acculturating the new people. They had to teach 
them and say, ‘everyone has a plan, but very few people can execute it.’ They had a 50% 
turnover of director and VP levels in first 6 months.  In the first 6 months, most high fliers 
from other companies failed.  If you were a people manager, you had to be a 5,000 
foot/50,000 foot people manager. One day, you had to have the details, then the next day 
you had to be able to talk strategy at the highest levels.  There are very few people who are 
wired to be ‘strategic doers’.  They’re either one or the other.”  Basadur’s framework would 
support the difficulty of finding employees who are “strategic doers” – the likelihood of a 
person being both a conceptualizer (strategist) and an implementer (doer) is remote.  
Finding a critical mass of these strategic doers was not easy, but Dell managed to do it 
through the early 2000s by looking specifically for such attributes as “dealing with 
ambiguity” and “learning on the fly” when hiring.  And then Dell began its massive hiring 
effort in 2004.  
The Corporate Services director continues, “ Dell realized (in the early 2000s) they 
had the wrong hiring model, because they kept hiring these people that were very, very 
strategic, and couldn’t get in and do the work. They had MBA students by the hundreds 
coming in.  They lost their culture.  They lost their ways.  After a while, Dell had as many 
cultures as they had managers, because each one was interpreting it a different way.  When 
they came out with the Soul of Dell, they were trying to get back to that, that culture, but 
Dell’s Third Horizon: 
The Innovation Imperative Heather Simmons 
	  
	   80	  
they didn’t have the person sitting in front of them, saying this is what I believe, this is the 
direction that we should be going.”  
The sheer increase in the number of employees from 2004 to 2006 also drove the 
development of that dreaded big company disease – bureaucracy.  In February 2007, when 
he returned as the company’s CEO, Michael Dell wrote the following in an internal memo 
to Dell employees: 
We have great people…but we also have a new enemy, bureaucracy, which costs us 
money and slows us down.  We created it, we subjected our people to it, and we have 
to fix it! (Slagle, 2007) 
I experienced the increase in bureaucracy myself over time.  This is best illustrated 
with two contrasting stories.  A couple of months after joining Dell in 1992, I was speaking 
with an engineer, the late Dennis Burleson, about a product he was offering in “stealth 
mode” to one of our largest customers.  The product he described to me was preinstalled 
software – software that came “ready to run” when you fired up your PC.  This was back in 
the early 90s, when computers came with a blue or black screen, the operating system 
installed, and not much else.  Installing application software such as Microsoft Office meant 
sitting at your desk with a cup of coffee, a stack of at least three 5 ¼” floppy diskettes for 
installation, and a couple hours worth of time on your hands.  Dennis explained that he had 
written a software script that loaded the application software ordered by the customer onto 
the hard drive as it made its way down Dell’s assembly line.  Because Dell built computers to 
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the customer’s specific order, it could, using Dennis’ script, load the customer’s required 
software for them.  Other competitors, who built to stock, would have no idea what software 
to put on the PC.  They instead relied on resellers to do this.  Dennis’ idea was simple, 
brilliant, met a significant customer need, and was something only Dell could do.  I asked, 
“Dennis, how many people have you told about this idea?”  Not many.  Dennis replied that 
he did not have enough resources as it was, and said, “If we told the world about this, I’d be 
swamped.”  Exactly.  Dennis agreed that if I could triple his resources, he would let me tell 
the world about the idea.  I raced back to my desk, ballparked the economics of the idea for 
Dell, and wrote an email directly to Dell’s president, Joel Kocher, proposing that we launch 
the business and triple Dennis’ resources.  I had only been at Dell two months and had never 
met Joel, so I thought that he might not read my email.  In 45 minutes, he sent me a note 
back:  “Sounds good.  You need a sales comp (compensation) plan.  Go.”  Six months later, 
with a rookie brand manager at the helm and a lot of help from colleagues and friends such 
as Tricia Traeger, Bob Gutermuth, the late Dennis Burleson, and Jenny Adkins, we 
launched ReadyWare, consisting of 81 software titles that could be preinstalled to any Dell 
customer’s order.  (It was supposed to be 82 titles, but Reader Rabbit Math was somehow 
misplaced).  It was a brand new business for Dell, led by a rookie with no formal authority or 
resources, and launched in 6 months during Dell’s First Horizon. 
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Fast forward to May 2003 at Dell Canada, when my boss (a former Bain consultant), 
told me that within the next 3 months we needed to dramatically reduce sales costs by 
shifting about half of Dell Canada’s consumer sales force to Hyderabad, India.  Setting up a 
call center in India had been done before, in the US and a few other geographies, as well as 
by Dell Canada’s technical support team.  Dell Canada’s Financial Services team had just 
begun the process.  Dell had a call center building in Hyderabad, with empty seats waiting to 
be staffed.  My boss (we’ll call him Tim) gave me the contact information for a Dell group in 
the US who was managing the process and assisting regions who wanted to shift headcount 
to lower cost geographies.  I phoned the lead for this group (we’ll call the group “Global Call 
Centers”), who explained that it would take 12-18 months to make the transition to 
Hyderabad.  (12-18 months???  I was incredulous.  What were we doing?  Developing a 
skyscraper?  Building a rocket ship?  Brokering peace between warring nations?  What on 
earth took so long?).  I asked as much, and he said, “Well, for starters, it will take you at least 
6 weeks to fill out our form.  Then, it goes into the queue, and we review it.  Then, we 
might have some questions.  There are lots of other regions trying to do this too, you know, 
and we are managing the process for all of them.”  I interrupted, “You’ll have your form in 2 
days.  And I’ll wait a week for you to get back to me with a date by which we can meet your 
rep in Hyderabad.  If you don’t get back to me by then, we’ll do it ourselves.”  I think he 
thought I was kidding. 
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We submitted the form two days later, putting our best estimates in for complex 
questions, such as the proportion of calls we thought could be handled by our Canadian reps 
vs. our future Hyderabad call center.  I let the Global Call Centers lead know the form was 
in and politely waited the interminable week (patience is not one of my virtues).  At the end 
of May 2003, I phoned our best and most senior sales manager, Tara Fine, a 28 year-old 
woman with great leadership skills.  Tara’s outstanding interpersonal skills belied a steely 
resolve and “whatever it takes” attitude.  And she had sales chops – her single-day record for 
sales by an inside sales rep still stands today.  I offered Tara the opportunity to build Dell 
Canada’s sales organization in India as a 3-6 month project.  (Even I thought 3 months was a 
bit tight given that India was halfway around the globe and neither one of us had ever been 
there).  Tara asked to think about it for a day.  About two weeks later, Tara was on her way 
to the airport for her flight to India.  That very day, my boss Tim called me, saying he was 
concerned that Tara, with only 6 years of working solely in Canada under her belt, might 
not have the experience to handle the complexity of this start-up effort in a foreign country.   
Thinking that sending someone else might be a better choice, he asked, “Do you have a 
back-up plan?”  I replied, “Tim, no, I don’t have a back-up plan.  Tara’s our very best sales 
leader, and she’s started new businesses for Dell before.  She’ll find a way to get it done.  And 
if you really want me to develop a back-up plan, you better tell me now.  Because she’s on 
her way to the airport as we speak.”  
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Tara landed in India, hired an outstanding senior sales manager to run operations 
there, and within the next few weeks had hired 42 sales representatives and 4 sales managers. 
She also addressed numerous operational issues, not the least of which was balancing call 
volumes so that they flowed between India and Canada appropriately given the resources 
available in each call center at various times during the day.  (OK, so the Global Call Centers 
team might have been right about that one – it was a complex question requiring 
considerable analysis).  On August 18, 2003, we took our first call in Hyderabad.  We’d 
pulled the whole thing off in just over 3 months, including the two weeks I spent 
impatiently “following” the corporate process and waiting for it to work.  Within a year, 
those Hyderabad reps were hitting the same performance targets as our Toronto reps.   
Meanwhile back in Canada, I had managed to not screw up the sales organization too badly, 
thanks to two of our sales managers who stepped up to help me.     
About two weeks before Tara’s team took our first call in Hyderabad, I got a call 
from a Global Call Centers representative, who said that she had reviewed our form and had 
a few questions.  No wonder the damn process typically took 12-18 months.  Launching a 
brand new, industry-first business from scratch with no formal resources took 6 months 
during Dell’s First Horizon.  Setting up a sales call center in India, following a known 
process previously executed by the U.S. and your own technical support organization, and 
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with “help” from a corporate team, was planned to take 12-18 months during Dell’s Second 
Horizon.   Michael was right – bureaucracy was the new enemy. 
The lesson?  Dell, through its hiring model, which looked specifically for the ability 
to deal with uncertainty and learn on the fly, found a critical mass of “strategic doers”, and 
this was a key part of its success in its First Horizon.  And then, in its Second Horizon, the 
company sought to bring in more strategists, and build the infrastructure required of a 
mature company.  This was likely a reasonable response to becoming a $50 billion company, 
but the shift in hiring was too much, too fast.  The rapid growth in headcount and the influx 
of strategists, with their focus on intellectual rigor and process, dampened Dell’s shared values 
of risk-taking and speed and created bureaucracies.  This, in turn, reduced Dell’s creative 
agility. 
Risk-Taking Slows  
As noted above, one of the most significant aspects of the change in culture was a 
decline in risk-taking, which impacted the company’s ability to innovate.  Pamposh Zutshi 
says, “I think by the 2000s we had become a big company, more process-oriented, for the 
right reasons, to some extent, because the dollars were so much bigger. In the 90s, the most 
important thing was to get it done.  In the later part of the 2000s, it was almost more 
important to be able to explain why you failed than to succeed.   So your 37 page 
Powerpoint deck became more important than actually making it happen.”   
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The company’s success and related competition for resources may have been a factor.  
Indraj Gill comments, “The risk-taking completely stopped.  It changed from a meritocracy 
at some point…When I was running Optiplex (corporate desktops), it took me two years to 
convince everyone we needed to split our product line.  This was unpopular, because it 
meant we needed more resources we didn’t have.”  Bill Sharpe adds, “I felt that the longer I 
worked with the company, the more risk averse it became, to the point I had to switch out 
the people who worked on it.  The penchant for action is one of the things that actually 
slowed down in the company.  What drove the risk aversion?  It was so successful, that over 
time nobody wanted to mess with the formula.  Everybody thought the train would keep on 
rolling.  What’s the line – the emperor has no clothes?  It was sacrilege to suggest that things 
might change.  The tolerance for risk-taking in the company was, at the end, 
almost completely and totally, none.” 
Sharpe also saw the impact of the drive to execute on innovation.  “I think it was 
entrepreneurial at the top, and at a certain managerial level.  But below that, it was 
execution, execution, execution.  Nobody was coming up with smart ideas.  At Dell, what I 
saw was that over time innovation slowly got throttled down.  I remember getting so many 
grey Dell Latitudes – my IT guy came in with a new Dell one day.  And I remember 
thinking, ok, this is just like buying another Ford sedan.  I wasn’t going to take it home and 
show anyone.”   
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Sharpe continues, “When we were doing a competitive review one day, I said, I think 
we better put Apple back in.  After Jobs came back.  Everyone laughed, and said that’s an 
idiotic idea.  But I said, no, Jobs is capable of radical innovation.” 
Some Dell employees recognized the need to return to an innovative culture, but 
were hampered by the fact that almost 80% of Dell’s revenue was in commodity PC 
products, with low margins that did not permit significant investment in research and 
development (“R&D”).  By the second quarter of Dell’s fiscal year 2014 (the last quarter 
before it went private), Dell’s R&D had climbed to 2.2% of revenues (Dell, 2014, 1), up 
from 1.2% in the fiscal year ended January 30, 2004 (Dell, 2004, 32).  However, the 2014 
figure was less than that of rivals IBM, whose R&D totaled 6.2% of revenues (IBM, 2014, 
123), or HP, whose R&D totaled 3.1% of revenues (Hewlett-Packard, 2014, 55).  The more 
consumer-focused Apple spent 3.3% of its 2014 sales on R&D (Apple, 2014, 33).  A 
Corporate Services director said, “At Dell, you had a dichotomy, engineers who desperately 
wanted to go back to an innovative culture, back to the days when PCs blew up in the lab 
because you tried something new.  But they were also realists, who understood that PCs were 
a commodity.  On the other hand, they were also looking at Apple in the early 2000s, and 
saying these guys are really innovative, and if we don’t get back to that, we’ll be less than 
they are.  And they were right.”   
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Tom Martin gets the last word on the topic: “I would say we had an anti-innovation 
culture.  The adoption of the belief in execution as the core took on a quasi-religious cast, 
such that anything that didn’t look like that was viewed with suspicion.”  The death of risk-
taking (a shared value) at Dell, coupled with a focus on executing on the core business and 
model, eventually drove out creative abrasion as employees stopped bringing new ideas 
forward.  And the absence of creative abrasion made creative resolution, so critical to 
disruptive innovation, “not applicable.” 
Pressures of Wall Street 
The pressure to hit Wall Street’s earnings targets also reduced Dell’s ability to 
innovate.  As Tom Martin puts it, “Another damaging thing was the focus on the stock price 
– all that execution was driving up the stock price.  We had a formal proposal on mobile 
devices in 1998.  It wasn’t dismissed because it was too early, but because it wouldn’t 
materially add to the stock price.  We thought it would be a $1 billion business within 3 
years, and that was not enough.  A couple years later, we would have projected a $5 billion 
business, but it would have cost real money to pursue it.  So it would have been rejected 
because, by then, we were struggling to hit flat earnings.” 
He continues, “By the 2000s, the stock price did a lateral for 10 years.  At that time, 
conversations would be about Wall Street not understanding if we put money in X, and it 
knocked money off the stock price.  10 percent of it was about the intellectual component – 
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having a group that can help you see what direction to take, and 90 percent was about 
managing Wall Street.  Ideas would get rejected, either because they were immaterial, or too 
big and would cost too much to go after.  I hate to be so simple-minded about it, but I think 
that was most of the deal.”  Of course, many companies face the pressures of Wall Street.  
There were 5,008 companies listed on major U.S. stock exchanges in 2013 (Strumpf, 2014).  
They all face these pressures.  The pressure was accentuated for Dell because of, first, the 
company’s extraordinary success.  Dell’s stock rose 19,008% between the end of 1991 and 
the end of 1999 (“Dell closing costs,” 2015), compared to a 91% increase for Apple’s stock 
over the same period (“AAPL Historical Prices | Apple Inc. Stock - Yahoo! Canada Finance,” 
2015).   The stock market’s expectations for Dell were very high.  Second, a management 
shift and a related focus on cost-cutting increased pressure to “focus on the core” rather than 
experiment.  Third, a market shift away from Dell’s strengths (such as the explosion of 
consumer-driven innovation exemplified by Apple’s “i” products) made achievement of 
targets difficult.   And fourth, thin margins in commodity products left little room for error. 
A 2012 study by Daniel Ferreira, Gustavo Manso, and Andre Silva concluded that 
the pressures of Wall Street impact a firm’s ability to invest for the longer term: 
…public firms choose more conventional projects.  Their managers appear 
shortsighted:  they care too much about current earnings.  They find it difficult to 
pursue complex projects that the market does not appear to understand well.  Public 
firms go private after adverse shocks, when it is clear that their business models are no 
longer working, and there is a need for restructuring. (Ferreira, Silva, & Manso, 
2012) 
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Martin adds, “I remember parking lot conversations about mobile.  When you go 
from a low percentage of laptops to a high percentage of laptops, you have a less configurable 
machine being built by the same outsourced company. So HP and Dell have the same supply 
chain, because they were outsourcing to the same guy.  And then you could see that smaller 
devices were coming, which were even less configurable.  This was 1998-1999.  We had 
parking lot conversations about the mobile business, and also formal business presentations.  
The conversation about treating this business as innovation-driven was treated like talking 
about transfer payments at the Republican convention – it wasn’t done.”   
Pamposh Zutshi relates another story about the impact of being a public company on 
business decisions.   “If you do the before and after, the inflection point was the late 90s, 
early 2000s.    In Product Group at the time, we had a couple of new business ideas.  One 
was digital TVs, we had 22 percent share of the world’s flat panel displays.  It would have 
been a $5 billion business for Dell.  We took our first TV from Powerpoint to product on 
the shelf in 4 months.  And we won every award at the CES (Consumer Electronics Show) 
tradeshow that year.   And it wasn’t just consumer – any business has digital signage.  We 
had the relationships – we weren’t going in cold.  The beauty was, we would not have to 
fight to get into these accounts – it was the same account executive.  We had 40% share in 
corporate desktops and notebooks in the Americas.  This was 2004.”  In the early-to-mid  	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2000s, gross margins for digital signage were between 20-25% (Planar, 2004), higher than 
for PCs, although they have since fallen. 
Zutshi continues, “We already had revenue in digital TVs, so it wasn’t like we were 
asking for seed money.  We asked for $2.5 million to set up shop (mostly for hiring 
engineers).  The senior executive said no – he wanted us to stick to the core.   In 2004, Dell 
missed corporate earnings, for 2-3 quarters in a row.  So, the stock tanked.  So, in his 
judgment, we had to go back to the core.   But we could see margins on desktops were very 
light, notebooks were headed the same way – we needed new sources of revenues.  And we 
already had pilots in (very large retailers) for digital signage – in the first year.  That was 
when I first felt that I was done with Dell.”   
This “focus on the core” in order to hit short-term earnings targets took its toll on 
Dell’s ability to capitalize on major industry product transitions.  Sharpe states, “Also, Dell 
completely and totally failed to see where the future of personal computing was going – 
Apple moved into content, started to create an ecosystem.  Dell missed content, ease of use, 
ease of design, the consumer, and perhaps most importantly, Dell missed mobile.  At the end 
of 2006, Intel, Dell, and Microsoft (“MS”) all missed mobile – a huge tech transition and 
they missed it.  All are still playing catch-up.  MS buys Nokia, writes it off.  Google buys 
Motorola, sells it for a vast loss.  All these guys didn’t see it coming.” 
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Other Changes and Conflicts 
Dell also struggled to find an inspiring purpose, an element in Hill’s framework, after 
it achieved the #1 worldwide market share position in 2001.  A former marketing director 
said, “Dell became a soul-sucking experience over time.  It had a purpose at the beginning – 
to be #1.  After we hit #1, it was ‘then what?’   There was nothing to strive for anymore.  
Dell had a purpose, but the purpose wasn’t reset.  It just became about cost-cutting – ‘how 
can we squeeze more blood out of the turnip?’  Employees became cogs in the machine.”  
Cost-cutting also impacted Dell’s relationships with suppliers and partners.  A former 
Corporate Communications manager recalls, “We were squeezing contractors and suppliers.  
We’d pay them in 45 to 60 days, instead of 30 days like most businesses.  It was brutal.”  Bill 
Sharpe notes that Dell could be a difficult culture to partner with:  “We had to put tough 
people on the account.  Dell was an odd culture, in that, with few exceptions, it was not a 
particularly friendly or approachable culture.  The demands on everyone were so intense, it 
took away the ability to create relationships or kick around ideas.  You were kind of in a 
machine.  Dell was kind of soulless.  I called it Texas capitalism.”  As we will see in a few 
pages, partnering with other companies, particularly start-ups, is vital to Dell’s success 
moving forward. 
This relentless focus on cost-cutting also took its toll on Dell’s customer service.  
Ironically, Dell’s stated mission was and is:  “Dell’s mission is to be the most successful 
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computer company in the world at delivering the best customer experience in markets we 
serve.”  Bill Sharpe says, “Customer experience was terrible.  Then the outsourcing of service 
went to India.  I remember being on those calls – it was obvious it was not going 
well…That’s where Dell Hell started – a complete and total collapse of customer service and 
the outsourcing of everything – a hollowing out of what had worked.  It was all part of this 
relentless cost reduction – reduce costs, reduce costs, reduce costs.”  “Dell Hell” is also well-
documented in Dell customer comments online.  In 2012, Rafe Needleman, a CNET writer, 
wrote: 
…a whole day of work re-organized for a tech (from Dell) who doesn't show up? The 
phone call from a (Dell) rep asking me to rate a support call that didn't happen? 
Nobody disrespects a customer like that and keeps their business for long. 
(Needleman 2012, par. 5, 10) 
As a further example, a laptop customer posting on tomsguide.com had this to say in 2014: 
I have a four year in-home next day service contract from Dell and explained to them 
what happened...they would be willing to send a tech over to reinstall windows on 
the bad drive even though it would probably cost them less to send me a new drive 
than it would to send the technician!  Is it just me, or is Dell's behavior really this 
bureaucratic? (Anonymous, 2014, par. 5, 6, 7) 
While a 2014 survey by Laptop magazine indicated that Dell’s customer service is 
improving, it still noted that the call time to Dell’s consumer service centers lasted just over 
27 minutes, the longest call time of any vendor in the survey (Low 2014, par. 1). 
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Some cost reduction was necessary because Dell’s industry was commoditizing.  
However, the relentless focus on cost-cutting caused Dell to lose sight of its purpose and 
damaged Dell’s reputation for service.   
Interviewees’ Views on The Way Forward 
Dell went private in October 2013 and stands poised to begin its Third Horizon, in 
which an organization typically articulates a preferred future state and executes on that plan.  
Interviewees were asked what their vision of Dell’s preferred future state would be.  Getting a 
purpose back and restoring the entrepreneurial culture were high priorities. 
  Indraj Gill recommends, “Create a set of values that this company is about.  Dell’s 
gotta find what its purpose is.  What kind of culture is valued?  And then protect those 
people even if they piss people off.  Not caustic people, but people who are doing the right 
thing for the business, not for personal gain.  If the culture’s about risk-taking, don’t beat 
people up who make mistakes.  Protect people who live the values.  The risk-taking culture 
doesn’t survive without leaders backing you up.” 
A former manager in Corporate Services notes, “To get Dell out of where they are 
and to go forward, they still need leadership and employee commitment.  I don’t know if 
they can get the culture back.  They’re so big and they’ve been there for so long now.  If they 
did some really interesting recruiting, took risks at the leadership level, maybe.  Hire 
mavericks, risk-takers, people who are not afraid to lead, with some charisma.”   
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 Those to-be-hired risk-takers need leaders who will listen.  Tom Martin said, “For 
example, the military is an execution culture.  It takes a special general to listen to the 
corporals who actually talk back to them – ‘you know if you do that, we’re going to be dead?’  
Michael is an extremely good listener.  Any entity the size of Dell has people capable of 
solving these problems.  He needs to make it clear to his lieutenants that they need to listen 
to these corporals who talk back.  Michael was such a good listener, he may have made the 
fairly common mistake that everyone was like that, and would listen.  Dell executives needed 
to find the dissident players and bring them forward.  And I’m not sure that happened.” 
Martin also recommends that some foresight and experimentation, as well as 
methods for investing capital in smaller firms, is critical.  He says, “You do actually have to 
know what to do once you free yourselves from the stock market shackles.  You need 5 or 10 
percent of the population focused on figuring out what the game changers are.  It would be 
easy enough to have a group of people focused on that.  Whether you paid attention to them 
or not is a different thing.  Knowing that an asteroid is going to hit the earth is not really 
useful if you are not planning to launch missiles to knock them out of the sky.  You have to 
work massively overtime on the belief that innovation or massive change is going to happen. 
And as a management team, you’ve got to be willing to respond, and you have to be willing 
to do the experiments to address the change that’s coming.”  
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Martin also recommends that senior Dell executives take a venture capitalist’s (“VC”) 
perspective on investment in new areas.  He says, “Some simple projects can be launched 
with existing human resources and minimal capital, like ReadyWare (Dell’s preinstalled 
software offering, launched in 1993).  But at the other end of the spectrum, imagine that 
automotive computing were some day going to be a $50 billion business divided between 3 
players.  Someone at Dell has done the analysis and figured out that this is a game changer – 
but it’s complicated.  That's because the regulatory, legal and reliability environment of 
automotive requires prototypes and lobbying and testing. We need $10 million and 30 
people to create a new venture. But the essence of that new venture is a PC – in a different 
form factor.  So we need partners and standards, but it is in or near our wheelhouse.  Now in 
this case I think our VCs (Dell’s senior executives) need to make a different and difficult set 
of decisions. Such as, is it a decent business, on paper?  Do we have the right people to 
experiment with this thing and are we willing to give them up to go do it?  And, how do we 
measure it?"   
I think Tom is right, and as usual our conversation inspired some creative thinking.  
Dell has to place some intelligent bets on technologies and companies in this age of 
exponential digital acceleration.  I think Dell has to become an “Intelligent Gambler,” using 
the framework (yikes, clearly, it is time for me to leave academia) in Figure 26: 
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Figure	  26	  –	  "Intelligent	  Gambler"	  framework	  for	  managing	  corporate	  venture	  investments.	  	  	  
In the Intelligent Gambler© framework, a company makes investments in a portfolio 
of new technologies based on the risk associated with the degree of difference between the 
current business and the new business, and also the capital required to launch the new 
business.  The required rate of return (the “hurdle rate”) rises as the degree of difference 
increases (to the right on the horizontal axis) and as the degree of complexity rises (up on the 
vertical axis).   For example, some projects are relatively similar to the current business (in 
this case PCs), and require only existing human resources and little financial capital.  To use 
a golfing analogy, they are “short putts.”  Little is risked, and so the hurdle rate expected is 
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low.  They are analogous to relatively safe short-term Treasury bills, which have yielded a 
return of about 3.5% since the market’s inception in 1928 (Damodaran, 2015).  On the 
other end of the spectrum are “game changers.”  These involve projects with a high degree of 
difference from the current business, which also require significant financial and human 
capital.  They may require skills or IP not found in the current business, necessitating an 
acquisition or partnership.  These are high risk, and require a high expected rate of return as 
a result.  They are analogous to (much) higher risk stocks.  Stocks in general have provided a 
return of about 10% since the stock market’s inception in 1928 (Damodaran, 2015), clearly 
much higher than the 3.5% low risk return that Treasury bills provide.  The actual hurdle 
rate required in each box will vary by business. 
Developing an Intelligent Gambler’s mentality would give Dell a significant 
advantage in a competitive environment of extremely rapid change.  First, partnering with 
smaller companies would allow Dell to avoid some of the “big company” problems of bloat, 
bureaucracy, and internal focus identified by Collins.  Second, technology is changing with 
increasing rapidity, as noted by Brynjolfsson and McAfee, and winners and losers are 
difficult to predict.  Dell has significant cash, at a time when venture capitalists are risk 
averse.  Bets on technologies “close to home” (left side of the framework) will help create 
sustaining innovations that extend existing advantages, while bets in areas less related to the 
PC have potential to disrupt those industries.  Dell can create competitive advantage by 
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using its significant capital to make appropriate bets on diverse technologies.  This is 
important because, in the digital era, winners and losers in a particular space are difficult to 
predict due to the pace of change.  As Elaine Chin, Chief Wellness Officer at Telus, puts it, 
when asked to pick the future winners and losers in wearables, “It’s like we’re right at the 
beginning with mainframe computers – whomever we pick won’t be around in 5 years.   It 
won’t be FitBit – the market dominant force in wearables today.  They are coming up with 
incremental stuff – they don’t have their eye on the guy down the street with the bioscan.”   
Dell’s acquisitions since 2008 are plotted against the Intelligent Gambler© 
framework in Figures 27 and 28.  Figure 27 depicts Dell’s acquisitions in 2008 alone.   
 
Figure	  27	  –	  Dell’s	  acquisitions	  in	  2008,	  applied	  against	  the	  Intelligent	  Gambler© 	  framework.	  	  Source:	  	  
Dell	  annual	  reports	  and	  press	  releases.	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As shown in Figure 27, Dell’s acquisition activity in 2008 was fairly modest, consisting 
principally of a $1.4 billion purchase of EqualLogic, a maker of a type of storage called 
iSCSI.   
Between 2008-2014, however, Dell acquired over 25 companies.  Notably, Dell 
made 10 acquisitions in the infrastructure/cloud services space, including a $3.9 billion 
purchase of Perot Systems in 2009.  The company also paid almost $2.4 billion for Quest 
Software, a maker of server and application performance management software.  Finally, 
Dell made three additional security acquisitions during this period, including SonicWALL 
for $1 billion in 2012, and SecureWorks for $612 million in 2011.   
Dell’s acquisitions throughout the period 2008-2014 are plotted against the 
Intelligent Gambler© framework in Figure 28.  (For an interactive version of this chart, 
please visit http://www.heathersimmons.ca/acquisitions.html).  Appendix E provides further 
details on each acquisition. 
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Figure	  28	  -­‐	  Dell's	  acquisitions	  between	  2008	  and	  2014.	  	  Source:	  	  Dell	  annual	  reports	  and	  press	  releases.	  
As shown in Figure 28, most of Dell’s acquisitions have been in the “Game 
Changers” box - high complexity, high degree of difference from the PC business.  
Importantly, Dell’s massive customer base allows it to introduce these acquisitions to larger 
customer opportunities and to fuel their global expansion.  Dell also has the power to 
combine innovations from this portfolio of acquisitions.  For example, the threat data from 
SonicWALL’s millions of appliance firewalls around the globe (“SonicWALL Firewall - 
Information, Reviews, Prices & Training - Firewalls.com” 2015, par. 2) can be combined 
with the billions of cyber security events that SecureWorks sees every day (Gagliordi 2014, 
par. 8) to give Dell unprecedented insights into threats.   By seeing more information on 
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threats, Dell knows more and can then proactively protect its customers.   By applying 
Brynjolffson and Mcafee’s “recombinant innovation” concept to its portfolio of acquisitions, 
Dell creates innovative solutions for customers and further leverages its advantages of scale, 
global complexity management, and significant cash flow.   Dell has boldly refashioned its 
product strategy around these acquisitions, as will be discussed in a few pages.   
 The Third Horizon – Changes in Culture, Structure, and Products 	  
As noted above, Dell’s rise during its First Horizon was driven by its entrepreneurial 
culture and employee commitment, which fostered risk-taking and rapid execution.  Most of 
this execution was directed to improving on its direct model, which was another significant 
source of advantage.  As described in the previous section, during Dell’s Second Horizon, 
four conflicts arose, all associated with the pressures of Wall Street and a shift in culture:  
1. There was and likely still is a conflict between the entrepreneurial types 
(“intrapreneurs”) who populated Dell’s first 15 years, and the process-oriented, 
analytically rigorous people hired from roughly the early 2000s onward.  How can 
Dell restore the entrepreneurial mindset and values so critical to innovation, without 
throwing out the processes and guardrails required in a $50 billion+ company?  
2. There was a conflict in terms of product and business model strategy.  Should 
Dell stay in the PC systems/services business (requiring more product innovation), or 
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become a distributor of a wider variety of products (requiring more business model 
innovation)?  Should they exit the client PC business (i.e., desktops and notebooks) 
entirely, and focus instead on servers, storage, software, and services? 
3. There was a conflict related to Dell’s customer service reputation, particularly 
with consumers, which suffered greatly in the 2000s as service was outsourced to 
India in an effort to reduce costs.  How can Dell address the negative perception of 
its service?  
4. As demonstrated by Carl Icahn’s vigorous, protracted, and very public fight 
to keep Dell public, there was considerable conflict about whether Dell should have 
gone private.  Dell boldly went private in 2013, in the largest such transaction since 
the financial crisis.  Now the question is, should Dell stay private or go public once 
again at some point in the next few years? 
My visit to Dell World in November 2014, along with a crowd of about 5,000 
others, helped considerably in demonstrating how Dell has addressed these conflicts as it 
moves into its Third Horizon, which began when it went private in the fall of 2013.  At Dell 
World, Dell rolled out its new product strategy, designed to address the dizzying array of 
trends in the market today.  In small group sessions, it also revealed its approach to regaining 
its risk-taker’s culture.  
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Return to Entrepreneurial Culture – with Guardrails 
Dell needs to regain their entrepreneurial spirit, while not losing all of the rigorous 
analytics and process that constitute the “guardrails” needed in a $60 billion company.  They 
have begun to do so, although infusing this spirit throughout the organization will likely be 
an ongoing, challenging task as cultures shift somewhat slowly.  Dell has recognized that 
innovation is vital to its future success, and that it must re-develop a culture in which the 
benefits of risk-taking exceed the costs, from the employee’s perspective.  This was evident at 
Dell World, where Dell’s classic openness and transparency was on full display.  In response 
to a question I asked about his earlier comment that Dell employees had at one point been 
“afraid to fail,” current Dell CFO Tom Sweet said, “We, for a number of years, fell into the 
trap of a management tone that said there wasn’t enough reward for trying something and 
not quite getting there – it was more of a stick if you tried it and you didn’t get there.   And 
recognizing that that was beginning to stifle risk-taking, and you need some element of risk 
in a business – not everything’s going to work.  You just don’t want it to be a disaster, by the 
way, so it has to be a thoughtful risk-reward thing.  For a number of years, I think we fell 
into that trap, and then we lifted our heads up a few years ago and said, ‘this isn’t the way 
we’re going to be successful.’  Michael deserves a lot of credit for that…You gotta have the 
culture and the tone at the top that says, ‘We want this conversation, we’re willing to 
change.’”  In other words, Dell is re-creating an original shared value, namely risk-taking.   
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Sweet was part of a Dell World panel titled “Rethinking innovation to enhance the 
customer experience.”  It also included Rebekah Iliff, Chief Strategy Officer of AirPR (a Dell 
partner), Jai Menon, Dell VP and Chief Research Officer, Mike Cote, VP and General 
Manager, Dell SecureWorks, and Jim Luisser, Managing Director of Dell Ventures.  Kicking 
off the panel, Rebekah said, “(It) really has to do with entrepreneurship, and acquiring the 
skills and expertise to continue to innovate at this rapid pace.  Within the (Dell) organization 
now, it’s no longer a question of ‘do we need to innovate’?  It’s ‘how do we make innovation 
central to the organization, and how do we move faster?’” 
Some of the innovation is coming from new acquisitions, such as SecureWorks.  
Cote said, “Innovation is going to come from multiple sources:  the guys who are paid to sit 
around and think about ‘n+2’ (i.e., beyond next generation) technology, and also from your 
front line people, the people who are doing things, who see how we could do things 
differently and better.  Figuring out how to get that that feedback into the organization and 
up (is key).   And, as we’ve all said, the failure word is not a bad word.”  Indeed, “failure” 
allows companies to learn from mistakes and pivot as needed in new directions.   
Cote’s organization, now called Dell SecureWorks, was purchased by Dell in 2011.  
The company was not integrated into Dell, and headquarters remained in Atlanta.  As one 
current employee said to me after I commented on the stepped-up pace of Dell’s 	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acquisitions, “Yes, and we no longer just absorb them like the Borg (the fictional alien race in 
Star Trek that assimilated other races).” 
Guardrails for managing risk remain in place, although the shift back to an 
entrepreneurial culture was much in evidence at Dell World.  For example, new “innovation 
councils” fund pilot projects and review execution against defined milestones every month.  
Tom Sweet also commented, about Cote’s organization, “After Michael said ‘grow, and we’ll 
give you as much capital as you need,’ the one thing I added to that was, ‘and by the way, 
you have to generate one dollar of cash flow in that growth strategy.’  That was my quid pro 
quo in that conversation.”  In other words, Dell is re-creating a shared value, rapid execution, 
while maintaining some guardrails or rules of engagement. 
The return to hiring entrepreneurs, and the stepped-up pace of acquisitions, may 
increase creative abrasion, creative resolution, and creative agility at Dell.  In short, it could 
increase Dell’s ability to innovate.  This ability to innovate is reflected in Dell’s substantially 
revamped product line, bringing us to the discussion of the second conflict. 
Changes in Product and Service Strategy 
Dell has also made a number of decisions and investments to resolve the second and 
third conflicts.  Dell has reset its product strategy based on customer feedback and 
technology trends.  At Dell World, I was quite surprised to see the degree to which Dell has 
shifted its product direction beyond commodity PCs and related services, and towards 
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higher-margin, higher growth businesses that have not commoditized.  While execution on 
this strategic shift remains, the strategy, at least, is in place – indicating that Dell’s Third 
Horizon has already begun.    
As highlighted at Dell World, Dell’s four technology focus areas are cloud, big data, 
mobile, and security.  In their breakout sessions and technology showcases, Dell also 
highlighted partnerships associated with the Internet of Things (i.e., connectivity and 
intelligence in everyday items such as cars and refrigerators), and they are now selling 3D 
printers made by MakerBot.  They restated their commitment to end-to-end computing 
(providing everything that an information technology customer needs – from PCs to servers 
to cloud to software to service).  They are most definitely not getting out of the PC business, 
which still provides the entry point for 70% of their new customers (McCabe 2014, par. 11). 
	  
Figure	  29	  -­‐	  Dell's	  product	  showcase,	  featuring	  big	  data	  and	  the	  Internet	  of	  Things	  ("IOT").	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Wait, isn’t this product strategy very “same-y” (as my very precise graduate program 
director puts it), relative to IBM and HP?  Yes and no.  Yes, in terms of the product 
categories Dell is pursuing.  It would be sheer folly for Dell to not be in cloud, big data, 
mobile, and security, which consistently hit the “top worries of IT directors” and “top 10 IT 
trends” lists (Gartner, 2014, par. 5, 8, 11, 14).  In addition, as shown in Figure 30, these 
markets each represent profit pools approaching the size of, or larger than, PCs.  Support for 
each calculation in Figure 30 is in Appendix D. 
	  
Figure	  30	  -­‐	  Author's	  Agile	  Product	  framework	  depicting	  Dell's	  revamped	  product	  mix.	  	  Source:	  	  analysts'	  
reports,	  author's	  analysis. 
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So, if Dell is going to be a profitable player in the IT business serving enterprise 
(business and government) customers, it needs to have product offerings in these categories.  
However, Dell differs from HP and IBM in that, first, it is the only IT player providing end-
to-end computing.  End-to-end computing is the provision of complete IT solutions, from 
PCs to servers, software, data management, security, and cloud offerings.  Second, Dell has 
always been a leader in open standards (Fuscaldo, 2003), not proprietary solutions.   Open 
standards are important to IT managers who are trying to increase compatibility and choice 
and cut costs (Glick 2012, 9).  Third, it has a stated focus on simplifying the customer 
experience (Turner, 2008, 1), which would significantly differentiate it in a world of rapid 
change and complexity. 
Dell is the only major IT player providing end-to-end computing.  IBM sold its PC 
business to Lenovo years ago, and HP just announced a decision to spin off its PC business.  
Dell is therefore leveraging assets it uniquely has, such as a complete mix of software, 
services, PCs, and enterprise products, and direct relationships with many enterprise 
customers (at one point Dell had a 40% share of the US corporate market).  Once Dell is in 
these enterprise accounts, it can sell customers its newer, higher-margin products such as 
security.  Dell is also leveraging its massive advantages of scale ($50 billion+ in revenues) and 
ability to manage complexity (111,000 employees).   Harvard professor Michael Porter’s Five 
Forces framework in Figure 31 reveals that scale is indeed a major requirement for success in 
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end-to-end computing, and the key is to move powerful customers into “stickier” products 
such as security and big data services rather than commodity PCs. 
	  
Figure	  31	  -­‐	  Michael	  Porter's	  Five	  Forces	  analysis,	  applied	  to	  end-­‐to-­‐end	  computing.	  	  	  Source:	  	  Author’s	  
analysis.	  
Regarding these newer products, Dell is often already a recognized industry leader (in 
capability if not in market share) in those markets, frequently due to a savvy acquisition.  For 
example, in managed security services, Dell SecureWorks is positioned in Gartner’s Leaders 
Quadrant, ahead of IBM, HP, Cisco, and Juniper (Kavanagh 2014, 2).  Gartner noted Dell’s 
Counter Threat unit’s security expertise, and its relationship management, as strengths.  
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Gartner also positions Dell in the Leaders Quadrant for private cloud and for Platform-As-A-
Service (McNabb, 2014).  Gartner highlights Dell Boomi, an application that facilitates 
simple “point and click” integration of other applications in the cloud.  A detailed Five 
Forces analysis by product offering is in Appendix D, including indications of Dell’s position 
relative to competitors (according to Gartner, IDC, etc.).  
Within these product categories, Dell focuses on open standards rather than 
proprietary solutions.  For example, in the cloud arena, Dell is co-developing offerings that 
run on Red Hat’s Linux OpenStack platform, instead of developing their own public cloud, 
as HP and IBM did (Burt 2013, par. 1, 4, 6).  Dell’s Cloud Marketplace, as discussed further 
below, is an easy-to-use, vendor-agnostic platform which allows customers to choose the best 
cloud solution for their needs. 
Dell’s new product strategy leverages its strengths (scale, capital, and an existing 
beachhead in business accounts – namely, PCs), while making bets in differentiated, higher 
margin product categories.  These bets will allow Dell to continue to innovate, rather than 
simply cutting costs to become the low cost player in a pure commodity market (PCs).  It 
also allows plenty of upside for growth – Dell’s market share in each of the cloud, mobility 
(tablet), big data, and security markets is less than 5% (Macomber 2014, par. 9) (Kelly 2013, 
par. 7), (Ubrani 2014, par. 5), compared to about 13% (Kitagawa 2014, par. 6) in PCs.   	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With this new product strategy, Dell is demonstrating creative resolution.  This 
strategy has elements of both product/service innovation and business model innovation. For 
example, Dell SecureWorks launches Dell out of the commodity hardware business and into 
the higher margin, faster growth security software business, complete with counter-threat 
intelligence experts and security operations centers around the globe.  When Dell acquired 
SecureWorks in 2011, SecureWorks was processing 13 billion cyber events per day.  By early 
2014 that number had grown to 70 billion cyber events per day (Gagliordi 2014, par. 8), 
and at that growth rate is likely about 120 billion daily cyber events today.  Security software 
is clearly a significant product innovation.  Dell’s cloud focus, on the other hand, has 
elements of business model innovation.  For example, in November 2014 they announced 
Cloud Marketplace, a portal that allows developers and IT managers to “compare, purchase, 
use, and manage” public cloud services and applications from Amazon, Google, Salesforce, 
Taleo, and others.  The portal is vendor-agnostic and self-service.  Recognizing that it is 
unlikely to be able to compete with Amazon, Google, and the like in providing public cloud 
services, Dell has become a vendor-agnostic distributor of those services.  They are in essence 
renting hardware to end users, and selling hardware to cloud providers.  By building strong 
partnerships with Amazon, Google, Salesforce, and others, Dell ensures that its servers, 
storage, and PCs serve as the backend infrastructure in those clouds. The creative resolution 
to the second conflict is thus:  Dell will innovate in both IT-related products and services, 
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and in the business model that allows them to distribute those products and services where 
they do not have an advantage in the product/service itself.  The significant shift in Dell’s 
product and services mix is shown in Figure 32 below. 
 
Figure	  32	  -­‐	  Dell's	  product	  mix	  over	  time.	  	  Source:	  	  Dell	  annual	  and	  quarterly	  financial	  reports.	  
One of my thesis advisors, reading the first draft of this thesis, said that I “sounded 
like a 14 year-old schoolboy with a crush on Madonna” in my enthusiasm for Dell’s new 
product strategy (my advisors are a staid bunch).  He insisted that I find the weakness in it.  
Well, that’s easy.  As noted earlier in Chapter 5, Dell clearly was late in transitioning to 
mobile form factors such as tablets, although it now has a tablet, the Dell Venue.  It is not in 
the top 5 in tablet market share.  Tablets are a hardware product that will likely commoditize 
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like PCs did (making relatively early market entry the only hope of making significant 
profits).  However, Dell chooses to be in the tablet business since tablets are complementary 
products to notebooks, in that users can now perform many computing tasks on a tablet, 
such as surfing the internet, or sending email.  Dell appears to be focusing its mobility 
offerings on consulting and offering security products associated with the increasing “bring 
your own device” (“BYOD”) trend in corporations, in which employees bring their own 
mobile phones and tablets to work rather than being issued a corporate version.  Dell’s lack 
of strength in mobility is a weakness in its vastly improved product portfolio. 
And then, as I write the final draft of this thesis, comes this news:  Dell wins the 
2015 Consumer Electronics Show “Best of Innovation Award” 
(http://www.shellypalmer.com/spb/2015/1/11/ces-2015-wrap-up) and “Best Mobile Device” 
(http://www.engadget.com/2015/01/08/best-of-ces-2015-winners/) for the Dell Venue 
tablet.  The world’s thinnest tablet comes with a “breathtaking infinity display” and a camera 
that allows you to manipulate pictures and apply real-time filters to them.  Sigh.  Never bet 
against Michael Dell.  It’s just a bad idea. 
The discussion of tablets as complementary products for PCs brings us to the topic of 
wearables, which are complementary products for tablets (for example, the Jawbone Up24 
fitness band output is read on a tablet or smartphone).  Miniaturization is now allowing 
computers to be worn.  Dell is investigating new computing form factors (one of the 
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breakout sessions I attended featured a Dell partner who was developing a wearable health 
monitoring device for seniors), but at Dell World I did not see as much emphasis on 
wearables as the market opportunity might dictate.   This stands as an opportunity yet to be 
addressed as Dell moves into its Third Horizon.  The wearables market is growing at over 
60% year on year and will be a $19B market within the next few years (Juniper Research 
Ltd. 2013, 16).  The market is fragmented, as the PC market was 25 years ago, creating an 
opportunity for larger players to consolidate it.  As Figure 33 shows, while there are already 
companies developing wearable fitness and entertainment devices for the consumer, there 
have been fewer applications developed for the business and government markets, Dell’s 
strength.  Margins exceed 50%, compared to sub-10% for PCs (Yarow 2013, par. 5).  
 
Figure	  33	  -­‐	  Wearables	  hardware	  and	  services	  revenue	  forecast.	  	  (Juniper	  Research	  Ltd.,	  2013)	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According to Elaine Chin, Chief Wellness Officer for Telus, the growth in wearables 
is being driven by the desire for self-quantification, and the healthcare needs of the aging 
Boomer population.  In an interview, she noted, “Self – quantification is the desire to take 
control of one’s own numbers.  People want to track how much sleep they get, how many 
sets they do, how many badges for making muffins they get.  It’s also about healthcare needs.  
Take, for example, old-fashioned home health monitoring – granny puts her arm in a blood 
pressure cuff, measures her oxygenation, etc., and is connected to her doctor via some sort of 
telepresence.  This already exists today.  Also today, you can download an EKG app, put it 
on your husband’s chest, and send that data to the emergency room.  Saves a trip to the 
emerg, and it’s available today.  In ten years, we’ll be slapping on a device like a band-aid or a 
temporary tattoo, that transmits all sorts of information to our doctors.”  “Weak signals” of 
this trend can be seen in the fitness tracking devices (such as the Jawbone Up24) of today. 
So Dell has substantially revamped its product line.  How is it addressing the third 
conflict, associated with its damaged reputation for customer service?  First, Dell continues 
to focus on enterprise customers (business and government) over the consumer.  Dell has 
wisely chosen not to storm Apple’s consumer citadel, much as it chooses not to compete 
head on with Amazon and Google in public cloud services.  Dell continues to view 
consumers as an “opportunistic” market (meaning, Dell will sell to consumers, but it is not 
the company’s focus).  As Michael Dell said in a September 2014 interview with CNBC:  
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We're bringing powerful solutions to our customers which are generally businesses 
and institutions. We have a consumer business but there's been a lot of focus at Dell 
on building solutions across the whole spectrum. So this is a combination of 
hardware, software, services together, to be able to virtualize an environment, build 
out a cloud data center, enable a salesforce to be productive but secure at the same 
time. (Fortt, 2014, par. 16) 
 
Most of the discussion about the consumer at Dell focuses on the “consumerization 
of IT” (Moorhead, 2012, par. 4), which means the trend of consumers bringing their own 
devices to work.  As shown in Figure 24, consumers have remained about 20% of Dell’s 
revenue mix since the mid-2000s.  This shapes Dell’s services offerings primarily towards the 
needs of enterprise customers, who typically require less hand-holding.  Second, in terms of 
creating a competitive advantage in service, I think that Dell will leverage big data internally 
to create a better customer experience.  Because Dell sold directly to the end customer, Dell 
always had better data on what that customer bought and how often, and what their service 
history was. In one of the Dell World breakout sessions I attended, Dell managers talked 
about using their data advantage to create “smart” products that will tell the customer when 
they need maintenance, or are about to fail.  For an IT manager, replacing a hard drive that 
is about to fail is a 30-minute inconvenience.  Replacing one after it has failed (with a user 
who has probably not backed up all his data) is far more disruptive than that.  Moving 
forward, I think that Dell can provide easy-to-use, low cost, and smart (predictive) products 
to strengthen their end-to-end relationship with customers.  They can also leverage social  
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media, such as Twitter, to rapidly and cost-effectively deal with service issues.  While turning 
around its service reputation will take time, predictive maintenance and use of social media 
provide a solid start. 
Dell has thus revamped both its product strategy and its business model strategy, 
reaffirming its commitment to the PC and end-to-end computing.  Its new value proposition 
has elements of the old – low cost products and services, and the new – “smart” services like 
predictive maintenance, and some critical expertise and IP in security.   
Going Private 
The fourth conflict, whether Dell should remain a public company or go private, was 
played out visibly in the press in a battle between Michael Dell and Carl Icahn.  The 
pressures of Wall Street were a very significant factor in Dell’s failing to make the needed 
investments in new areas such as mobile devices.  Sweet said, about going private, “I think it 
was a very symbolic step.  Michael loves to talk about the fact that he’s no longer on a 90-day 
cycle.  The fact of the matter is, I’m still on a 90-day cycle, because I’m still talking to all the 
debt people, the analysts, but he’s not.  But I do think it was a catalyst, to leapfrog that 
conversation forward, as a demonstration to the organization.” 
Innovation is likely to increase now that Dell is a private company.  A July 2014 
study by Shai Bernstein at the Stanford Graduate School of Business concluded that going 
public caused a decline in the novelty of patent filings (as measured by the number of 
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citations a patent receives after it is approved), but not the number of patent filings, 
suggesting that transitioning to the public equity markets causes firms to reposition their 
R&D portfolio towards more conventional projects (Bernstein 2014, 3).  A similar working 
paper at INSEAD (working title “Entrepreneurial Exits and Innovation”) also found that 
innovation quality was highest under private ownership and lowest under public ownership, 
again using patents as the measure (Hsu and Aggarwal 2013, 24-25).  Hsu and Aggarwal 
found that the reason for this was “information disclosure” – since public companies are 
required to report their results, managers back safer, more core projects in order to produce 
results in the short term.  In a subsequent interview conducted by INSEAD Knowledge, 
Aggarwal discusses Dell’s “going private” transaction: 
Dell is a great example: One of the reasons they’ve been less innovative over the past 
decade or so is because they’ve been under constant public scrutiny. Part of the 
motivation behind the buyout is to spur innovation at all levels of the company. 
(Aggarwal and Kessler 2013, 16) 
 
The 2012 study, “Incentives to Innovate and the Decision to Go Public or Private,” 
by Daniel Ferreira, Gustavo Manso, and Andre Silva, also concludes that private firms are 
more innovative: 
Private firms take more risks, invest in new products and technologies, and pursue 
more radical innovations.  Private firms are more likely to choose projects that are 
complex, difficult to describe, and untested…Mergers and acquisitions, divestitures, 
and changes in organizational structure and management practices are more easily 
motivated under private ownership. (Ferreira, Silva, and Manso 2012, 288) 	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Finally, going private reduces the obsession with growth that is built into the stock 
prices of fast-growth companies such as Dell.  This obsession with growth, as pointed out by 
Collins, leads to short-term thinking as companies try to hit growth targets, and an internal 
focus as companies constantly reorganize in an attempt to seek incremental growth at the 
lowest cost.   
The remaining question is whether Dell should stay private, or return to the public 
markets.  My own analysis, as shown in Figures 34 and 35, bears out the benefits of Dell 
staying private.  Using the information in Dell’s filings with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) at the time it went private, it is possible to estimate the relative 
revenue and profit contribution of its core PC business (desktops and notebooks), its core 
Enterprise Solutions business (servers, storage, and services), and its newer businesses (cloud, 
tablets, security, enterprise software, etc.).  For the information of my fellow accountants, I 
am using operating income as the profit measure – everyone else, just think plain old 
“profits,” or revenues minus costs.  The SEC filings and the work of consultants Boston 
Consulting Group (“BCG”) and J.P. Morgan also allowed me to estimate growth rates for 
each product category, under both “stay private” and “go public again” scenarios (Collis, 
Yoffie, and Shaffer 2013, 10-36).  Product categories in the charts below include 
“Commodity Core” (desktops, notebooks, peripherals, and related services), “Enterprise 
Core” (servers, storage, and related services), and “Innovation” (infrastructure, cloud and 
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security services, applications and business process services, software, and tablets).   Details 
for supporting assumptions and sources for the scenarios in Figures 34 and 35 are in 
Appendix F.   Figure 34, immediately below, depicts the revenue scenarios.   
 
	  
Figure	  34	  -­‐	  Dell	  2023	  revenues	  under	  "go	  public"	  and	  "stay	  private"	  scenarios.	  	  Source:	  	  Author’s	  
analysis,	  (BCG,	  2013),	  (J.P.	  Morgan,	  2013),	  (Collis,	  Yoffie,	  and	  Shaffer	  2013,	  10-­‐36).	  
Dell’s estimated 2013 revenues (it went private in fall of 2013) were $57 billion 
(BCG 2013, 11) with estimated operating income of about $2.3 billion (Dell, 2013b, 30) 
(Dell, 2013a, 50-52).  If Dell goes public within a year or two, by 2023, it could be a $56 
billion company (revenues) with about $3.6 billion in profits.  This assumes a compound 
annual growth rate (“CAGR”) shrinkage of about .3% per year, driven by a 6% annual 
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shrinkage in its core PC business (J.P. Morgan 2013, 12) which is not completely offset by 
significant growth in more innovative businesses.   On the other hand, if Dell stays private 
and invests in the growth of innovation-driven businesses such as security, big data, cloud, 
and mobility, by 2023 it could be an $87 billion business (4-5% CAGR), with $6 billion in 
profits.   Figure 35 depicts the profit scenarios.  
	  
Figure	  35	  -­‐	  Dell	  2023	  profits	  under	  "go	  public"	  and	  "stay	  private"	  scenarios.	  	  Source:	  	  Author's	  analysis,	  (BCG,	  2013),	  (J.P.	  Morgan,	  2013),	  (Collis,	  Yoffie,	  and	  Shaffer	  2013,	  10-­‐36).	  
Most of the revenue and profit growth in the “stay private” scenarios is accounted for 
by an estimated 18% revenue CAGR in Dell’s innovation-driven product lines.  This rate is 
1.5X the growth rate (Dell 2013, 5) of those innovation-driven markets, namely security, big 
data, mobility, and cloud.   As examples of growth rates in these markets, the security 
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services market growth is projected to be 15.4% between 2013 and 2019 (Verrastro, 2014), 
and the business intelligence (big data) market grew 8% in 2013 (Sommer 2014, 1).  Further 
details of growth rates by market are in Appendix D.  For those doubting that a very large 
company can grow total revenues in the 4-5% range, Dell grew at a CAGR of 11.6% during 
the period 2004-2006, when it was a $50 billion company.  Apple had $183 billion in 
revenues in 2014, and grew at about 7% (Golson 2014, par. 3).  The important conclusion 
in this sea of numbers?   I argue that Dell’s 2023 profit could be 70% higher if it stays private 
rather than goes public again. 
Dell is now the third largest private company in the world, behind Cargill and Koch 
Industries (Nixon, 2014).  And based on Michael Dell’s comments about the benefits of not 
being on a 90-day clock, Dell seems unlikely to go public again anytime soon. Will they go 
public, and if so, when?  Let’s start with why companies in general go public.  Companies go 
public because they need capital, an enhanced reputation with customers, or a boost to their 
brand.  Dell had about $12 billion in cash (Dell 2013a, 3) when it went private, and strong 
cash flow.  Dell does not need capital, and it has a leading share amongst its enterprise 
customer base as well as a well-recognized brand.  Also, the stock market did not recognize 
Dell’s shift in product mix or record revenue performance in its fiscal year 2012, before Dell 
went private. The stock actually declined in 2012.   Dell has no reason to go public again. 	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Will Dell need to go public to create liquidity for the principal investors?  Michael 
Dell provided $4.2 billion or 75% of the equity in the buyout, and Silver Lake contributed 
$1.4 billion or 25% of the equity (Carey and Clark 2015, par. 2, 3).   The remainder of the 
$24.9 billion buyout price consisted of $18 billion in debt and some of Dell’s cash (Carey 
and Clark 2015, par. 1, 8).  Dell paid down its debt by $3 billion last year, using its strong 
cash flow (Carey and Clark 2015, 8).  This resulted in Standard & Poor’s (debt rating 
agency) upgrading Dell’s corporate credit rating by two notches, and upgrading its senior 
unsecured debt by three notches (“Dell Upgraded by S&P as It Chips Away at Its Debt” 
2014, 2, 8).  The price of Dell’s debt, as shown in Figure 36, has risen by about 60%.  
	  
Figure	  36	  -­‐	  Price	  of	  Dell	  debt	  issue,	  November	  2013	  to	  March	  2015.	  	  Source:	  	  Bloomberg.	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Debt investors, therefore, are getting repaid.  On the equity side, if Michael Dell or 
Silver Lake requires liquidity, the company can issue dividends from its cash flow, so there is 
no need for Dell to go public in order to provide ongoing liquidity for these investors.  
However, Silver Lake may eventually want to exit its Dell holdings entirely, in order to 
provide a realized gain for investors in its fund.  Indeed, the estimated value of Michael Dell 
and Silver Lake’s equity holdings rose from $5.6 billion in 2013, at the buyout, to $10.8 
billion less than a year later (Carey and Clark 2015, par. 2).  That is over a 90% gain on the 
equity alone, in one year.  It is an impressive gain, but it is only a gain on paper until 
someone buys Silver Lake out.  Typical holding periods for private equity funds are at least 5 
years (Parker 2013, 10), which puts a likely Silver Lake exit sometime after 2018.  There is, 
however, no need to go public in order to buy Silver Lake out.  Given the relative proportion 
of their equity holdings and Michael Dell’s other assets, Michael could buy Silver Lake out 
himself, or the company could do it, again from cash flow.  It’s also unlikely that Dell will be 
sold privately to another firm.  Given the size of the $24.9 billion buyout in 2013 and the 
possible 70% increase in profits by 2023, the price would likely be a steep $40B+.  Nine of 
the ten largest high tech acquisitions of all time were for less than $20 billion (Forrest, 
2014).   Given that Dell has no need to tap the public markets and is unlikely to be 
purchased by another firm, it will likely remain a private company, with Michael Dell as the 
principal shareholder. 
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Whew.  I’m calling it now, in February 2015.  Dell stays private.  By the early 2020s, 
revenues are $90 billion or so.  Profits are $6-7 billion.  Dell is recognized as one of the 
world’s most innovative firms.  Go ahead and call me crazy.  You’ll be buying the beers. 
One Last Thing 
Linda Hill’s voice just popped into my head.  “Hey Heather, you’ve talked about 
Dell resetting its shared values and rules of engagement, and how Dell is using acquisitions, 
venturing, and its own research think tank to get its creative abrasion, agility, and resolution 
back.  What about ‘purpose’?  This Third Horizon thing’s going nowhere if Dell doesn’t 
have a purpose its people can get behind.”  The analysis is not complete until you’ve covered 
the whole damn framework. 
Dell also has its purpose back.  Michael Dell has stated that he believes that 
“technology is about enabling human potential,” and he expanded on that at Dell World by 
saying that technology can help address mankind’s greatest challenge – abundance for all 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qy-kz1ZhCaQ).  Peter Diamandis, Chairman of 
Singularity University and co-founder of the X-Prize, spoke at Dell World and defined 
abundance for all as “health, education and access to resources so that every man, woman, 
and child can live sustainable lives.”  Dell calls this “Powering the Possible.”  Several Dell 
World speakers discussed how technology can help create abundance in all corners of the 
world.  Kiva Loans’ founder Jessica Jackley, for example, noted that Kiva’s internet-based 
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micro-lending platform has enabled $630 million in loans from lenders in developed 
countries to entrepreneurs in developing countries.  Diamandis argued in his Dell World 
keynote that the presence of ubiquitous, cheap technology such as accelerometers and 
cameras allows poor entrepreneurs in developing countries the opportunity to lift themselves 
out of poverty.   Michael Dell, who was named the Global Advocate for Entrepreneurship 
for the UN Foundation, states that the pace of technological change means that the 
proportion of jobs created by emerging businesses will go up (Leber, 2014, par. 9).    
Not everyone believes that technology shrinks the gap between rich and poor, or that 
the developed world has any business helping those in developing nations lift themselves out 
of poverty.  For example, Arturo Escobar, author of the 1995 book Encountering 
Development, expressed the view that western nations have “discovered” poverty in the third 
world so that they can reassert their moral and cultural superiority (Reid-Henry 2012, par. 
3).  Other scholars such as Pippa Norris have argued that technology has the potential to 
further the divide between developed and developing countries, because developed countries 
have the capital to invest in newer technologies (Norris 2000, 16-17).  Richard Maxwell and 
Toby Miller (2012, 3) state that by 2007, up to 50 million tons of e-waste generated 
annually in the Global North (including the U.S.) were dumped in the Global South 
(including Latin America and China).  Other scholars point to the risk that jobs could be 
eliminated by technology.  According to Carl Frey and Michael Osborne, scholars at Oxford 
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University, up to 47% of U.S. jobs are subject to automation within the next decade, 
particularly low skill and low wage jobs (Frey & Osborne, 2013, 38, 42).  However, even 
with these cautions, “enabling human potential” is a broad, transcendent vision that many 
Dell employees will likely be able to get behind.  Dell is also working to ensure that 
technology does not increase the divide.  For example, in 2009, Dell became the first in its 
industry to ban the export of e-waste to developing countries (“Recycling your Dell,” 2015).  
Summary and Additional Recommendations 
Will these changes help Dell be more innovative?  As shown in Figure 37 below, Dell 
has put in place many elements required to create an organization both willing and able to 
innovate. 
   
Figure	  37	  -­‐	  Dell's	  current	  position	  on	  the	  "Willing	  and	  Able"	  framework,	  as	  depicted	  by	  the	  author.	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We return also to the Three Horizons framework.  Clearly, Dell has learned much 
from its Second Horizon, and the lessons can be applied to other large firms. 
 
Figure	  38	  -­‐	  Dell's	  current	  position	  on	  the	  Three	  Horizons	  framework,	  as	  envisioned	  by	  the	  author. 
Dell has articulated a preferred future state and identified several elements required to 
get there (principally, an entrepreneurial organization, an exit from Wall Street, and a 
revamped product line).   How will they know this is all working?  Key performance 
indicators might include internal growth and profit targets, patents granted and cited by 
others, awards for product and service innovation, and analyst rankings. 	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Recommendation:  Fly Your Freak Flag in Hiring 
In addition to these preferred state elements put in place by Dell, I have several 
recommendations, based on this study.  First, Dell should fly its freak flag in hiring, at all 
levels.  Urban Dictionary defines the term “fly your freak flag” as:  “A characteristic, 
mannerism, or appearance of a person, either subtle or overt, which implies unique, 
eccentric, creative, adventurous or unconventional thinking” (White, n.d.).  As noted in 
Chapter 3, intellectual diversity has been critical in some of the biggest innovations of our 
time.  And as identified in this chapter, Dell’s massive influx of people, including many 
consultants, helped result in a culture that tilted too far away from entrepreneurial execution 
and towards process-oriented analysis.  Hire some creative people, some statisticians, and 
some artists and designers, and mix them into the business units.  
Recommendation:  Train Managers to Be Intelligent Gamblers 
Second, hire managers who listen, and who encourage risk-taking and thoughtful 
failure.  Train them to be “intelligent gamblers” and establish regular reviews and incentives 
to ensure some of these new technology ideas get funded.  As Robert Sutton says, reward 
failure and success, but punish inaction (Sutton, 2006, 6).  This will be the hardest part of 
the transition to the “world’s largest start-up,” because employees have long memories and 
related stories (which are told and retold) of the days when risk-taking was not encouraged.  	    
Dell’s Third Horizon: 
The Innovation Imperative Heather Simmons 
	  
	   131	  
Recommendation:  Stay Private 
Third, stay private.  As shown in Figures 34 and 35, staying private produces 
superior profits, relative to going public again.  
Recommendation:  Combine Innovations to Improve Service	   
Fourth, combine big data and the cloud to further simplify IT and improve Dell’s 
service reputation.  Dell could, for example, extend its predictive analytics advantage in 
services by making its products predictive and self-healing, combining the power of the 
cloud, software-as-a-service models, and big data.  Not only could the hard drive notify you 
that it was about to fail, but the system could diagnose the problem in real-time, and run the 
appropriate “correcting” software (like anti-virus, or defragmenter) immediately, without 
user intervention.  It could also automatically back up your system for you, to the cloud.  
The faulty system could notify Dell that there is an issue, and order the appropriate 
replacement part.   Adding self-healing capabilities moves services powered by predictive 
analytics from the “Sustaining Innovations” box to the “Game Changers” box on the 
Intelligent Gambler© framework, because it requires some investment in companies that are 
dissimilar to the existing PC business. 
Recommendation:  Combine Innovations to Simplify IT for SMBs 
Fifth, invest human and financial capital into simplifying IT for small and medium 
businesses (“SMB”), which must make choices about the dizzying array of options for 
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phones, faxes, computers, cloud services, security, and application software.  Dell could, for 
example, extend its Cloud Marketplace idea to create an SMB Marketplace, which provides 
SMBs with guidance as to the right phone, fax, PC, cloud, security, and application 
providers for their needs.  SMBs can select the products and services needed, bundle them 
with PCs or tablets, and order the entire bundle directly from the SMB Marketplace.  Cash-
crunched SMBs could even select an option to pay a single monthly “per seat” charge for 
these bundles, with no long-term contracts, using Dell Financial Services as the financing 
arm.   At the end of a certain period of use, say three years, Dell could automatically pick up 
any old PC hardware and install upgraded versions, simplifying life for the SMB and creating 
annuity revenues and long-term relationships for Dell.  Long-term relationships in this sector 
are highly profitable for Dell – Dell’s SMB segment had 11.2% operating income for the 
fiscal year ended February 1, 2013, compared to 8.7% for Dell’s Large Enterprise segment, 
8.3% for the Public (government) segment, and negative operating income for the 
Consumer segment (Dell 2013b, 41).  Adding an array of new products, services, and 
financing options for small business moves the Cloud Marketplace concept from the “Seeds 
of Disruption” box to the “Game Changers” box on the Intelligent Gambler© framework, 
because of the additional complexity and capital required to integrate multiple products into 
a single bundled offering. 	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Recommendation:  Invest in Enterprise Wearables 
Sixth, find a way to invest in enterprise wearables, or at least experiment with them 
in a small way.  Wearables may cannibalize smartphones and tablets like those technologies 
cannibalized the PC industry.  Best to be ahead of, rather than behind, that trend.  
In sum, Dell’s promising third act is built on the bitter lessons of its Second Horizon.  
Dell has put in place many of the elements required to resolve the conflicts of the Second 
Horizon, and to re-establish the organization’s willingness and ability to innovate, in an era 
in which innovation is more crucial than ever before.  They’ve put in place an inspiring 
purpose that employees can get behind.  Now all they have to do is execute.  And if you 
don’t know whether they can do that, you may not have been following along. 
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Chapter Six – Conclusions and Future Research 
Conclusions 
This study addressed the research question: “What caused Dell’s growth rate and 
stock price to decline in the mid-2000s, and how might Dell thrive once again?”  More 
broadly, the research fused Innovation and Foresight frameworks to create a deeper 
understanding of how large companies can capitalize on the accelerated pace of innovation 
fomented by the digital revolution.   The study analyzed how innovative cultures are created, 
lost, and reborn in large companies through the lens of a long-term case study, namely my 
13 years at Dell Inc.  My long-term personal relationships have given me unprecedented 
access to the people who helped create Dell.  The research also included a three-day visit to 
Dell’s annual customer conference, Dell World, which illuminated Dell’s new product and 
service strategy, as well as highlighted some tensions that had led to the decline in innovation 
at Dell. 
The study identified tensions between the initial entrepreneurial employees who 
populated Dell in its first 15-20 years, and the analytical and process-oriented consultants 
who were brought in en masse in the mid-2000s, as Dell nearly doubled its workforce in 
three years.  In addition, the research showed that the tension between the need to identify 
and invest in future technologies and the need to meet Wall Street’s short-term quarterly 
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targets significantly dampened innovation at the company.  The study also highlighted that 
new technologies are producing new problem-solving possibilities at an exponential rate, and 
therefore managers must develop what Roger Martin terms “an opposable mind.”  
The research showed that Dell can’t, and shouldn’t, return to the past, as it is no 
longer a $2 billion American company run by a 27 year-old.  It has, however, learned much 
from its changing environment and the bitter lessons of its Second Horizon.  The preferred 
future state for Dell is a) a workforce both willing and able to innovate for the long-term, b) 
a private capital structure, and c) a product line which is diversified away from commodity 
PC products, and towards emerging trends such as security, big data, and wearables. 
The study showed that achieving this preferred state will require considerable effort 
to create intellectual diversity within the Dell employee population and to re-establish risk-
taking at the company, while maintaining financial guardrails required for a large firm.   
More broadly, the research identified the need for large corporations to take an “intelligent 
gambler’s” approach to resolving the tensions associated with fostering innovation in large 
firms by investing in, partnering with, and acquiring other firms which are producing 
intellectual property and technology in relevant fields.  Intelligent gambling leverages assets 
unique to large companies – financial capital, and the ability to manage global complexity.  
In high technology, in particular, this intelligent gambler’s mindset must pervade the entire 
organization, not just be tucked away in a mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) group.  The 
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Intelligent Gambler© framework developed as part of the study provides business leaders 
with a structured approach to analyzing these investment opportunities, based on the degree 
of similarity to the current business and the complexity of the target business.  
The research and analysis also determined that Dell should remain private, because 
private firms are more innovative than public ones.  It also showed that, if Dell remains 
private, its profits in 2023 could be 70% higher than its profits if it chooses to go public in 
the next couple of years.  
Linda Hill and her colleagues’ “Willing and Able” innovation framework provided 
the most appropriate lens through which to evaluate Dell’s return to an entrepreneurial 
culture.  “Willing and Able” is simple and pragmatic.  Its elements are also clearly 
represented in the real-world case study of Dell.  It is clear from the analysis that an 
organization has to have a bunch of risk-taking mavericks who are willing to innovate, as 
well as a few pointy-headed accountants and leaders with opposable minds in order to enable 
that innovation.  Curry & Hodgson’s Three Horizons framework was useful in terms of 
identifying conflicts in Dell’s “messy middle” period of roughly 2001-2012.  Porter’s Five 
Forces analysis was useful in assessing Dell’s new product portfolio, which moves it well 
beyond PCs, an unattractive commodity market with high competitive intensity. The study 
also shows that Dell must improve its customer service, which was historically a strength but 
became a weakness as Dell cut costs in the early-to-mid 2000s. 
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 Beyond Dell, the study is an illustration of how strategic foresight, the right mix of 
mavericks and MBAs, “intelligent gambling” and an appropriate capital structure can bring 
back risk-taking at large corporations.  The Intelligent Gambler© framework provides a 
useful guide for accelerating innovation in large organizations, in a way that balances 
financial concerns with risk-taking and product portfolio management.  The Agile Product 
Portfolio framework illuminates the need for large corporations to continually invest in 
“small” opportunities with high growth potential, and to couple those with some sort of cash 
cow or Trojan Horse business that both pays the bills and allows access to a larger customer 
set.  The work also highlights the importance of integrative thinking, or the agility of 
thought required for innovating in the exponential acceleration of the digital age.   
What did I personally learn during this process?  Well, my thesis advisor pointed out 
that I am both a maverick and an MBA and have an “opposable mind,” something that 
would explain why there always seem to be at least 2-3 voices arguing in my head about any 
major decision.   In some respects I agree, although I prefer to simplify problems in order to 
speed decision-making, whereas leaders with true opposable minds are comfortable with 
complexity.  I’m also impatient, so I do not hold conflicting thoughts for long.  However, I 
am comfortable with ambiguity and love to learn new things.  I’ve had so many diverse life 
experiences that I can usually understand multiple perspectives without becoming wedded to 
any particular one (all consistent with an opposable mind).  I’ve been a detail-oriented 
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accountant, a strategic consultant, a risk-taking maverick, a marketer for a $50 billion 
company, and CEO of a start-up.  I will shortly have advanced degrees from two schools, 
one described as “the Marine Corps of capitalism” and the other an art and design school 
with an ethos somewhere left of center.  I love to learn new things, and that’s served me very 
well in the chaos of the digital era.  Which makes me think, if we want more leaders with 
opposable minds, schools may need to shift their curricula.  Teach students to “love to 
learn,” experiment, and prototype in addition to teaching them what they need to learn.  
(Turns out some brainy people who give Ted Talks agree – see the Marshmallow Challenge 
at http://marshmallowchallenge.com/Welcome.html).  Teach them to seek the different 
rather than the same, in order to better understand diverse perspectives and have the ability 
to pull innovation from anywhere.  This will eventually create more leaders who have 
Martin’s “opposable mind,” and are willing and able to be intelligent gamblers. 
In conclusion, this was not just an academic exercise.  I lived it.  I remember it as an 
idealistic young woman who had a tiger by the tail, and I also see it now through the lens of 
30 years of business experience.  It was a hell of a ride, and it is a hell of a lesson for Dell and 
the rest of the business world.    
  
Dell’s Third Horizon: 
The Innovation Imperative Heather Simmons 
	  
	   140	  
Future Research 
In terms of Dell-specific research, it would be useful to increase the number of 
former employees interviewed, particularly outside North America, to understand whether 
the challenges were similar in other geographies.  It would be helpful to interview customers 
who have been with Dell over the entire period of the mid 90s to the current period, to 
understand their viewpoint on Dell’s changing culture, products, and opportunities over that 
period.  
More broadly, it would be useful to analyze the results associated with use of the 
Intelligent Gambler© framework, across several years and several large companies.  This 
would help assess whether the key performance indicators were effective in identifying both 
successful and failing investments in a timely manner.  A further study could review to what 
extent public, private, and higher education curricula reflect coursework which develops the 
characteristics of an “opposable mind,” and what changes might need to be made to that 
curricula.  To the extent that other large public companies decide to go private in order to 
avoid the short-term pressures of Wall Street, it would also be useful to assess whether 
innovation (as measured by patents, or product awards, for example) increased as a result of 
their going private.   Another inquiry could analyze potential changes in laws and regulations 
that could help public companies remain innovative.  Finally, it would be helpful to study 
how large companies negotiate a return to, and manage the expectations of, public markets.  
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Appendix B 
Sample Interview Guide 	   	  1. You	  were	  at	  Dell	  from	  XXXX-­‐YYYY,	  in	  brand	  and	  product	  marketing.	  	  	  How	  would	  you	  describe	  Dell’s	  culture	  when	  you	  arrived?	  	  	  When	  you	  left?	  	  	  What	  were	  the	  significant	  deltas	  between	  these	  periods?	  	  How	  did	  Dell’s	  marketing	  strategy	  change	  over	  this	  period?	  	  Were	  there	  any	  significant	  innovations?	  	  2. Tell	  me	  a	  story	  about	  an	  experience	  that	  sticks	  with	  you,	  from	  your	  time	  working	  with	  Dell.	  	  	   3. Dell	  grew	  at	  about	  50%	  year	  on	  year	  for	  most	  of	  the	  1990s,	  and	  had	  the	  highest	  return	  on	  equity	  of	  any	  stock	  in	  the	  Fortune	  500	  during	  this	  period.	  	  Please	  rank	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  following	  factors	  in	  Dell’s	  success,	  with	  1	  being	  the	  most	  important	  and	  10	  being	  the	  least	  important.	  	  	  a. Risk-­‐taking/speed	  of	  decision-­‐making	  b. Innovation	  c. Entrepreneurial	  culture	  and	  employee	  commitment	  d. Direct	  business	  model	  –	  no	  middleman,	  lower	  inventory,	  lower	  cost	  e. Partnerships	  with	  other	  companies	  f. Execution	  g. Customer	  service	  h. Leadership	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i. Incentives/stock	  options	  j. Other	  (please	  specify)	  Which	  of	  these	  factors	  will	  be	  most	  important	  for	  Dell’s	  future	  success	  (pick	  3)?	  	   4. Dell’s	  growth	  then	  moderated	  to	  less	  than	  10%	  year	  on	  year	  for	  much	  of	  the	  2000s.	  	  To	  what	  do	  you	  attribute	  this	  slowdown?	  	  	  5. Dell’s	  made	  19	  acquisitions	  in	  the	  last	  5	  years,	  primarily	  in	  the	  newer	  areas	  such	  as	  security,	  big	  data,	  and	  enterprise.	  	  How	  well	  did	  Dell	  partner	  with	  others	  when	  you	  were	  there?	  	  What	  are	  some	  best	  practices	  that	  you’ve	  seen	  in	  this	  area,	  from	  other	  companies?	  	   6. When	  we	  joined,	  Dell	  was	  a	  $3	  billion	  company.	  	  Today,	  it	  is	  a	  $60	  billion	  company.	  	  	  The	  direct	  model	  was	  very	  innovative,	  but	  some	  say	  Dell	  has	  lost	  its	  entrepreneurial	  culture	  and	  ability	  to	  innovate.	  	  What	  are	  some	  of	  the	  best	  practices	  you	  have	  seen	  in	  larger	  organizations,	  in	  terms	  of	  encouraging	  and	  sustaining	  innovation?	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Appendix C 
  Interview Participants 
 
Horizon Mktg/Sales Engineering/Product 
Development 
Operations/ 
Mfg 
Finance/HR/ 
Service 
Partners 
1984-2000 
(First  
Horizon) 
• Interviewee 
#10 (North 
Am) 
• Interviewee 
#7(APAC 
and North 
Am) 
• Interviewee 
#8 (North 
Am) 
• Interviewee #3 (North 
Am) 
• Interviewee #5 (North 
Am) 
• Interviewee 
#3 (North 
Am) 
• Interviewee 
#4 (North 
Am) 
 
• Interviewee #6 
(North Am) 
• Interviewee 
#2 (North 
Am) 
2001-2012 
(Second 
Horizon) 
• Interviewee 
#10 (North 
Am) 
• Interviewee 
#7 (APAC 
and North 
Am) 
• Interviewee #5 (North 
Am) 
 • Interviewee #9 
(North Am) 
• Interviewee 
#2 (North 
Am) 
2013-?? 
(Third 
Horizon) 
    • Interviewee 
#1 (North 
Am) 
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Appendix D 
Detai led Five Forces Analysis 
 
 Security 
Outsourcing 
Big Data Cloud Mobility 
(Tablets) 
PCs 
Market Size $12 billion (“B”) 
(NTT 2014, par. 
6) 
$14.4B 
(Sommer 
2014, par. 1) 
• $155B for 
public cloud 
(Columbus 
2013, par. 2, 
3) 
• $32B for 
private cloud 
(Gaudin 2014, 
par. 4) 
• $143B for data 
centre (Paye 
2015, par. 6) 
250 million 
tablet units 
or $70-80B 
(“The State 
of the Tablet 
Market,” 
2015) 
315 million 
units 
(Kitagawa 
2015, par. 14) 
or roughly 
$200B (Arthur 
2014, par. 9). 
Growth 15.4% through 
2017 (NTT 2014, 
par. 6) 
8% in 2013 
(Sommer 
2014, par. 1) 
• 20% for 
public 
cloud(Gaudin 
2014, par. 4) 
• 40-50% for 
private cloud 
(Gaudin 2014, 
par. 4) 
11-12% for 
2014 (“The 
State of the 
Tablet 
Market,” 
2015) 
-.2% for 2014 
(Kitagawa 
2015, par. 14) 
Operating 
Margin 
18-50% (James 
2013, par. 6) 
Roughly 
25%(Alessi 
2015, par. 8) 
Approximately 
20-25% 
(Gottfried 2013, 
par. 9)  
About 25% 
(“Biggest 
Tablet Profit 
Margins: 
Microsoft, 
Apple” 2012, 
par. 9) 
<5% (Arthur 
2014, par. 16) 
Profit  Pools  $3B (calculated as 
$12B X 25% 
operating margin) 
$4.5B 
(calculated) 
$50B+ 
(calculated) 
$18B 
(calculated) 
$10B 
(calculated) 
Buyer Power High for large 
corporations, 
moderate for 
small/mid sized 
businesses 
(“SMBs”). 
High, 
typically 
large 
corporations. 
High, cost 
conscious. 
High. High. 
Threat of  
Substitution 
Moderate – cloud-
based offerings. 
Low – 
learning 
curve.  
Low to 
moderate, in-
house IT. 
High -  
smartphones, 
phablets. 
High, tablets, 
smartphones. 
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 Security 
Outsourcing 
Big Data Cloud Mobility 
(Tablets)  
PCs 
Supplier  
Power 
Low – only 
suppliers are for 
servers, storage, 
energy, and other 
commodities. 
Low. Moderate, 
electrical power 
may become 
constrained. 
Low. Low – 
commodity 
products. 
Competitors • Verizon, IBM, 
HP, Symantec 
(large). 
• Checkpoint, 
Fortinet, 
Sophos, Cisco, 
Juniper (SMB). 
IBM, SAS, 
Oracle, 
Tableau, 
Microsoft. 
Amazon, 
Google, 
Rackspace, 
AT&T in public 
cloud.  IBM, 
HP, others in 
private cloud. 
Apple, 
Samsung, 
Asus, 
Lenovo, 
Amazon. 
Lenovo, HP, 
Acer, Apple. 
Dell  Posit ion Gartner Leaders 
quadrant for both 
SMB and large, 
ahead of IBM, 
HP, Cisco, Juniper 
(Kavanagh 2014, 
par. 5). 
Not in 
Gartner 
Leaders 
Quadrant 
(Columbus 
2015, par. 
4). 
Gartner Leaders 
Quadrant for 
data center 
outsourcing 
(private cloud)  
along with HP 
and 
IBM(Maurer, 
Ackerman, and 
Britz 2014, par. 
8).  Does not 
compete in 
public cloud 
with Amazon, 
Google, etc. 
Not in top 7 
in market 
share (Reader 
2015, 7). 
#3 worldwide 
with 13% 
market share 
(Kitagawa 
2015, par. 
14). 
Barriers  to 
New Entry 
High – big data 
analytics and 
expertise required. 
High – 
insights 
required. 
High - requires 
scale. 
High - 
requires 
scale. 
High – 
consolidated, 
requires scale. 
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Appendix E 
Acquisit ion Detai l  	  
Acquisition Description Type Year Price 
EqualLogic iSCSI storage Enterprise 
Solutions 
Group 
(“ESG”) 
2008 $1.4 billion 
(“B”) 
Message One SaaS for compliance, archiving, and disaster 
recovery 
Security 2008 $164 million 
(“M) 
The Networked 
Storage Company 
Transitioning storage network 
infrastructure 
ESG 2008 Undisclosed 
Perot Systems IT consulting services Cloud 2009 $3.9B 
Allin Microsoft 
Services 
Designing scalable networks and 
application architectures 
ESG 2009 $12M 
Kace Management (“mgt”) appliances - device 
discovery, SW distribution, patch mgt 
Mobility 2010 Undisclosed 
Scalent Datacenter infrastructure/workload mgt Cloud 2010 Undisclosed 
Boomi Cloud application management software – 
allows easy transfer of data between cloud-
based and on-premise applications.   
Cloud 2010 Undisclosed 
InSite One Cloud-based medical archiving - archive 
software and storage of medical images, 
with disaster recovery. 
Cloud 2010 Undisclosed 
Ocarina Networks Storage compression and content-aware de-
duplication.  Data management. 
ESG 2010 Undisclosed 
Exanet Clustered network-attached storage 
("NAS") 
ESG 2010 $12M 
Compellent Mid-range fibre channel storage. ESG 2011 $960M 
Force10 Data center networking – switches and 
routers 
ESG 2011 $700M 
SecureWorks SaaS managed security services Security 2011 $612M 
RNA Networks Server and memory virtualization 
technology 
ESG 2011 Undisclosed 
Quest Software Server, access, and application performance 
management 
Software 2012 $2.4B 
SonicWALL Security appliances and management, back-
up and recovery 
Security 2012 $1B 
Make 
Technologies 
Application modernization software and 
services.  Application re-engineering.  Run 
most effectively on open, standardized 
platforms including the cloud. 
Cloud 2012 Undisclosed 
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Acquisition Description Type Year Price 
Credant 
Technologies 
Data protection from endpoints, to service, 
storage, and the cloud 
Security 2012 Undisclosed 
AppAssure Server, data, and application backup and 
recovery for virtual, physical, and cloud 
infrastructures 
Security 2012 Undisclosed 
Gale 
Technologies 
Deployment and infrastructure mgt for on-
premise and hybrid clouds 
Cloud 2012 Undisclosed 
Clerity Solutions Application modernization and re-hosting.  
Transitions business critical applications 
and data from legacy systems to modern 
architectures, including the cloud. 
Cloud 2012 Undisclosed 
Wyse Technology Thin client solutions with advanced 
management, desktop virtualization, and 
cloud software. 
Cloud 2012 Undisclosed 
Enstratius Cloud-infrastructure management for 
public, private and hybrid-cloud 
deployments, either SaaS or on-premise 
Cloud 2013 Undisclosed 
Statsoft Predictive analytics. Big Data 2014 Undisclosed 
 
Source:  Dell annual reports and website, (Bort, 2012). 
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Appendix F 
    Public vs. Private Scenarios 
     Supporting Detai l  
 
Revenues 
($M): 
Public 
Company 
2013 2023 CAGR Notes and Sources 
Innovation 
Group 
$5,000 $11,000 8.2% • Dell infrastructure, cloud, security services revenues 
were $2.4 billion (“B”) annualized in 2013 (Dell 
2013a, 39). 
• Dell applications and business process services 
revenues were $1.2B annualized in 2013 (Dell 
2013a, 39). 
• Dell software revenues were $1.2B annualized in 
2013 (Dell 2013a, 39). 
• Dell tablet revenues were roughly $500 million 
(“M”) in 2013 (BCG 2013, 9). 
• Total Innovation Group revenues estimated at $5B 
for 2013 ( roughly sum of above). 
• CAGR estimated at about 8% based on Dell 
infrastructure/cloud services 2013 growth rate of 
8%, consistent with low end of market rate of 8-
17% (Sommer 2014, par. 1) (NTT 2014, par. 6) 
(Columbus 2013, 2). 
Enterprise 
Core 
$15,000 $25,500 5.4% • Dell Enterprise Services Group (“ESG”) annualized 
2013 revenues $13B, with annualized ESG portion 
of services revenues $1.2B (Dell 2013a, 39). 
• Total Dell Enterprise Core revenue therefore 
estimated at $15B for 2013. 
• CAGR estimated at about 5%.  Boston Consulting 
Group (“BCG”) estimated Dell’s ESG revenue 
growth at 5.1% in base case scenario for Dell Board 
(J.P. Morgan 2013, 10). 
Commodity 
Core 
$37,000 $19,000 -6.4% • Dell End User Computing (“EUC”) annualized 
revenues of $35B for 2013, net of tablet revenue.  
Annualized EUC portion of services revenues 
$3.5B.  (Dell 2013a, 39)   
• Total 2013 EUC revenues estimated at $37B, 
consistent with BCG estimates. 
• BCG assumes EUC shrinks at 6% CAGR (J.P. 
Morgan 2013, 10). 
Total Public 
Revenues $57,000 $55,500 -.3% 
• 2013 Dell revenues estimated at approximately 
$57B (BCG 2013, 11). 
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Revenues 
($M):  
Private 
Company 
2013 2023 CAGR Notes and Sources 
Innovation 
Group 
$5,000 $27,000 18.4% • Michael Dell has said he would like to double the 
size of the combined businesses represented by 
Innovation Group and Enterprise Core, by 2019 
(Schatzker 2014, p. 3).  That growth rate implies 
these businesses will be about $60B combined by 
2023. 
• 18% CAGR assumed as a private company, or 
about 1.5X market growth.  (Sommer 2014, par. 1) 
(NTT 2014, par. 6) (Columbus 2013, 2) 
Enterprise 
Core 
$15,000 $33,000 8.2% • Dell server revenue grew 5.7% in 2014 (Eastwood 
2015, par. 6), and storage revenue grew 14.3% in 
the first half of 2014 (Chanthadavong 2014, par. 
3).  Servers are  about 85% of ESG revenue (Dell 
2013a, 39). 
• Dell Enterprise Core CAGR therefore estimated at  
roughly 8% (weighted avg. of server and storage 
growth figures). 
Commodity 
Core 
$37,000 $27,000 -3.1% • Dell grew PC units 10.3% in 2014 (Loverde 2015, 
par. 6).  PC average selling prices (“ASPs”) decline 
about 10% per year (Statista, 2015). 
• 3% annual decline assumed in Commodity 
revenues due to assumed pricing aggressiveness as a 
private company (i.e., ASPs decline more than 
10%). 
Total 
Private 
Revenues 
$57,000 $87,000 4.3%  
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Operating 
Income 
(“Op Inc”) 
($M):  
Public Co. 
2013 2023 
2013 
Op  
Inc % 
2023 
Op 
Inc 
% 
Notes and Sources 
Innovation 
Group 
$585 $1,625 11.7% 14.8% • Combined operating income (“op 
inc”) for Dell Software and Services 
was 11.6% in first half of 2013.  
Services alone was 16.7%, with 
Software negative.  (Dell 2013a, 52).  
11.7% assumed.  Software should 
reverse its negative margins. 
• Op inc therefore assumed to grow 2-3 
points faster than revenue for this 
group under public scenario.  
Assumed op inc CAGR of 10.8% 
results in 2023 op inc of $1.625B, or a 
14.8% op inc percentage. 
Enterprise Core $675 $1,500 4.5% 5.9% • Op inc of 4.3% in ESG as of Aug 2, 
2013 (Dell 2013a, 51), grows at 5-8% 
per year (Dell Special Committee 
2013, 18). 
• Assumed 8.3% op inc CAGR yields 
2023 op inc of $1.5B, or 5.9% of 
sales. 
Commodity 
Core 
$1,000 $425 2.7% 2.2% • Op inc of 2.4% in EUC as of August 
2, 2013 (Dell 2013a, 50).  2.7% 
assumed. 
• Op inc for EUC shrinking at 8-15% 
CAGR per BCG (Dell Special 
Committee 2013, 18). 
• Assumed op inc shrinkage of 8.2% per 
year results in 2023 op inc for this 
group of $425M, or a 2.2% op inc 
percentage. 
Total Public 
Op Inc 
$2,260 $3,550 4.0% 6.4% 
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Operating 
Income 
(“Op Inc”) 
($M):  
Private Co. 
2013 2023 
2013 
Op 
Inc % 
2023 
Op 
Inc 
% 
Notes and Sources 
Innovation 
Group 
$585 $3,600 11.7% 13.3% • 2023 op inc is set to  approximately 
1.5-2 percentage points lower than 
under public company scenario, to 
reflect increased R&D spend. 
Enterprise Core $675 $1,800 4.5% 5.5% • 2023 op inc is set to  about .5 
percentage points lower than under 
public company scenario, to reflect 
slightly increased R&D. 
Commodity 
Core 
$1,000 $600 2.7% 2.2% • Op inc set at same % as public 
company scenario.  Increased R&D 
unlikely. 
Total Private 
Op Inc  
$2,260 $6,000 4.0% 6.9%  	   	  
